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  INTRODUCTION   
It is difficult to know what to expect when you are expecting, 
particularly in the workplace. A woman may be delighted to 
share the news of her pregnancy with friends and family, yet ap-
proaching that same discussion with her boss is fraught with un-
certainty. Numerous career advice websites and articles exist to 
help expectant mothers navigate this potentially daunting and 
“anxiety inducing”1 discussion.2 The fear, of course, is that if this 
discussion sours, the consequences may be dire: a strained rela-
tionship with the boss, lost future workplace opportunities, un-
willingness to accommodate pregnancy-related issues, or termi-
nation.  
A closer look at the existing evidence on pregnancy discrim-
ination in the workplace, however, may lead to the suspicion that 
 
 1. Jessica Pallay, How to Tell Your Boss You’re Pregnant, HUFFINGTON 
POST: WELL ROUNDED NY (Apr. 25, 2016, 5:50 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/ 
entry/how-to-tell-your-boss-you_b_9774440. 
 2. See, e.g., Laura June, How to Tell Your Boss You’re Pregnant, CUT (Mar. 
9, 2016), https://www.thecut.com/2016/03/how-to-tell-your-boss-youre-pregnant 
.html (describing the discussion of pregnancy with a boss as a “collision course”); 
Liz Ryan, How to Tell Your Boss You’re Pregnant, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizryan/2014/08/15/how-to-tell-your-boss-youre 
-pregnant (providing advice and a sample script for telling a boss about preg-
nancy); When and How to Tell Your Boss You’re Pregnant, WHAT TO EXPECT 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://whattoexpect.com/pregnancy/work-issues/politics-and 
-policies/when-to-tell-your-boss.aspx (offering tips “to prepare and break the 
news” to your boss). 
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such apprehension is exaggerated, or even unfounded. The exist-
ing evidence on pregnancy discrimination relies on anecdote. Ac-
counts from the media and litigated cases form the bases of pop-
ular and scholarly discussions,3 making it impossible to decipher 
whether such accounts are singular or representative. Further 
undercutting claims of persistent discrimination are two 
longstanding federal laws that, in theory, should remedy—or at 
the very least quell—the problem: the 1978 Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act (PDA), which prohibits discrimination “on the basis 
of pregnancy,”4 and the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of being “sub-
stantially limit[ed in] a major life activity.”5  
The prior reliance on anecdote in matters of pregnancy is 
not the result of disinterest in providing an empirical context for 
pregnancy discrimination. Rather, the major barrier to obtaining 
better evidence has been a lack of data.6 At any given time, ap-
proximately three percent of women in the United States are 
pregnant.7 Since most observational datasets are limited to a few 
thousand observations (which include men and women of all 
ages), the available sample of pregnant women is typically too 
small to draw meaningful statistical inferences about pregnancy 
in the labor market.8 As a result, empirical research on preg-
nancy discrimination is almost nonexistent—leaving scholars 
with no choice but to rely on anecdote.9 
 
 3. See infra Part II (discussing purported improvements in workplace con-
ditions for pregnant women). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 5. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(i). 
 6. See infra Part III (noting that the data used in this Article is the only 
available dataset of its kind). 
 7. This figure is calculated from the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) and U.S. Census Bureau figures in 2010, which recorded 6.155 
million pregnancies and 157.0 million women. This ratio is then multiplied by 
40/52 since women observed in a given year were only pregnant for 40 out of 52 
weeks. See Sally C. Curtin et al., 2010 Pregnancy Rates Among U.S. Women, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 2015), https://www.cdc 
.gov/nchs/data/hestat/pregnancy/2010_pregnancy_rates.pdf; Women’s History 
Month: March 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.census 
.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb12-ff05 
.html. 
 8. See infra note 145 and accompanying text (describing how other com-
monly used labor market datasets either do not identify pregnant women or are 
too small for the purpose of studying pregnant women in the labor market). 
 9. See infra Part III (noting the dataset analyzed in this Article is the only 
large sample of pregnant women). 
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Yet pregnancy discrimination must be contextualized. As 
long as accounts of pregnancy discrimination in the labor market 
continue to be based in anecdote, they remain easy to dismiss as 
not real or as the result of pregnant women making different ca-
reer choices than nonpregnant women and than men.10 But preg-
nancy discrimination cannot be dismissed. As this Article will 
demonstrate, it is one of the most pervasive and harmful forms 
of systemic discrimination in the U.S. labor market. Using the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)—a large, 
national dataset compiled each year by the CDC to assess Amer-
icans’ health behaviors and health status11—this Article is the 
first to assess how pregnant women fare in the labor market, as 
compared to nonpregnant women. After all other underlying dif-
ferences between pregnant and nonpregnant women are taken 
into account, pregnant women are 4.2 percentage points less 
likely to be employed than nonpregnant women. This gap in em-
ployment outcomes—a gap that cannot be explained by volun-
tary choice, demographics, or educational characteristics—is the 
pregnancy penalty. 
Economists have often referred to negative employment out-
comes based on other personal characteristics as penalties;12 the 
 
 10. In fact, accounts of pregnancy discrimination, and sex discrimination 
more generally, are frequently dismissed by commentators. See, e.g., Vanessa 
Brown Calder, On the Gender Pay Gap, I’m Not with Her, CATO INST.: CATO 
AT LIBERTY (Sept. 9, 2016, 2:29 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/gender-pay-gap 
-im-not-her (“[M]en and women work in different industries with varying levels 
of profitability[,] and . . . men and women on average make different family, 
career, and lifestyle trade-offs.”); Tom Ciccotta, “Equal Pay Day” Reminds Us 
that the Gender Wage Gap Myth Persists, BREITBART (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www 
.breitbart.com/economy/2017/04/04/equal-pay-day-reminds-us-gender-wage 
-gap-myth-persists (“[I]t is not America’s oppressive and discriminatory patri-
archal society that is to blame for such raw wage differences, but rather the 
different choices that men and women make with regards to their labor such as 
desired fields of work, and total amount of hours worked.”). But see Olga Kha-
zan, The Mommy-Track Myth, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic 
.com/business/archive/2014/02/the-mommy-track-myth/283557 (“‘We often see 
women returning from maternity leave who are given less work or dead end 
assignments,’ Dina Bakst, head of the advocacy group A Better Balance, told 
NPR. ‘And this type of discrimination really drags down wages for women be-
cause they get off track, and even worse off and pushed out of the workforce.’”). 
 11. The 1993–2016 BRFSS data is used in the estimations presented 
throughout the rest of this paper. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Sys., An-
nual Survey Data, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https:// 
www.cdc.gov/brfss/annual_data/annual_data.htm (last updated Sept. 4, 2018) 
[hereinafter BRFSS Annual Survey Data]. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A.2 (comparing employment disparities between preg-
nant and nonpregnant women to employment disparities between different 
races and ethnicities). 
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race penalty and the ethnicity penalty13 are well known. As this 
Article will demonstrate, the magnitude of the pregnancy pen-
alty rivals the magnitude of these well-documented penalties.14 
The pregnancy penalty also far surpasses another well-known 
penalty, the motherhood penalty.15 Moreover, the baseline preg-
nancy penalty widens even more substantially for women facing 
other disadvantages, such as low education,16 disability,17 and 
obesity.18 
Using the findings generated by this first empirical over-
view of pregnancy in the labor market, this Article will argue 
that remedying pregnancy discrimination must become a more 
urgent priority for civil rights advocates and scholars. Pregnant 
women remain among the most vulnerable workers in the labor 
market, even in the presence of two federal laws allegedly avail-
able, but insufficient, to protect them. Although this Article is 
hardly the first to point out the inadequacy of legal protections 
for pregnant women, it is unique in its approach to the solution. 
In the absence of other available evidence, prior scholars have 
been forced to rely on litigated cases to suggest a solution; I rely 
on data. Using the BRFSS data, I demonstrate why the solution 
favored by most scholars, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act 
(PWFA), is unlikely to be effective. Instead, I argue that paid 
family leave, available before and after childbirth, offers the bet-
ter solution. Indeed, because paid family leave is already man-
dated in a handful of states, I use data from these states to 
demonstrate how a well-crafted family leave law can ameliorate 
the pregnancy penalty. 
In making these arguments, this Article proceeds as follows: 
Part I begins by considering the different components of preg-
nancy that may produce discriminatory behaviors among em-
ployers, and Part II reviews the current legal protections against 
pregnancy discrimination at the federal level. Part III introduces 
the data and methodology necessary for this study, which is used 
in Part IV to examine pregnancy discrimination empirically. 
 
 13. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 14. See infra Part IV.A.2.  
 15. See infra Part IV.B.1 (examining the connection between the mother-
hood penalty and the pregnancy penalty). 
 16. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing differences in the pregnancy penalty 
based on socioeconomic status). 
 17. See infra Part IV.B.3 (comparing employment outcomes for disabled 
pregnant women and nondisabled pregnant women). 
 18. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the relationship between the preg-
nancy penalty, weight, and appearance). 
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Part V continues to use these data to evaluate the most com-
monly proposed legislative solution, the PWFA, as well as the 
solution favored by this Article, paid family leave legislation. A 
brief conclusion follows. 
I.  ACCOUNTING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
PREGNANCY PENALTY   
Before diving into the empirical evidence regarding the fre-
quency, the magnitude, and the form of the pregnancy penalty, 
it is useful to consider why employers may discriminate against 
pregnant women. After all, pregnancy ushers in a multitude of 
changes, both short-term and long-term, that can be difficult to 
separate. In the short-term, pregnancy is a medical condition 
that, through itself or through the development of common sec-
ondary health conditions, can have tangible and apparent phys-
ical effects on a woman’s body. First, and most obviously, preg-
nancy is a condition that can alter a woman’s appearance, 
principally through weight gain.19 Second, pregnancy and its 
complications may partially or wholly incapacitate a woman for 
some period of time surrounding the birth of a child.20  
In the long-term, even as the physical transformations of 
pregnancy subside postpartum, at least one life-transforma-
tional effect of pregnancy remains: a child.21 Pregnancy serves 
as a signal of impending motherhood, which, from an employer’s 
perspective, has two important implications. First, pregnancy 
implies that caretaking will likely occupy a relatively larger por-
tion of the woman’s time than it had previously.22 Second, to the 
extent that employers, their customers, or pregnant workers 
 
 19. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing pregnancy’s impact on appearance). 
 20. Typical complications that can restrict pregnant women to bed rest, es-
pecially towards the end of their pregnancies, include preeclampsia, gestational 
diabetes, and cervical incompetence. See Bed Rest, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N (May 
4, 2017), http://americanpregnancy.org/pregnancy-complications/bed-rest (re-
viewing bed rest causes and benefits and providing advice for how to handle the 
experience). 
 21. Of course, not all pregnancies end in live births; the miscarriage rate 
for known pregnancies is between fifteen and twenty percent. Because most of 
these miscarriages occur by the seventh week of pregnancy, pregnancies that 
end in live births are the most likely to have long-term effects. See Miscarriage, 
MEDLINEPLUS (Dec. 21, 2017), https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001488.htm 
(“Most miscarriages occur during the first 7 weeks of pregnancy.”). 
 22. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Average Hours per Day Parents Spent 
Caring for and Helping Household Children as Their Main Activity, U.S. DEP’T 
LAB. (2017), https://www.bls.gov/charts/american-time-use/activity-by-parent 
.htm (showing that mothers with children under age six spend an average of 
2.68 hours caring for children). 
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themselves believe that mothers belong at home with their chil-
dren, pregnancy may threaten a woman’s long-term employ-
ment.23 This Part briefly explores these short- and long-term ef-
fects of pregnancy, paying close attention to the known 
reverberations of these effects on women’s employment out-
comes. 
A. SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF PREGNANCY 
1. Pregnancy as Appearance Altering 
The nine months of pregnancy can alter a woman’s appear-
ance in many respects; changes in skin,24 hair,25 bra size,26 and 
even shoe size27 occur quite frequently in pregnant women. Yet 
the most common—and most obvious—appearance-related 
change in pregnancy comes with respect to a woman’s size. 
 
 23. Although prior studies have unpacked pregnancy discrimination into 
multiple component parts, they have generally ignored pregnancy’s appearance-
altering effects and focused instead on pregnancy’s disability, caregiving, and 
status components. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the 
Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 575–84 (2010) (acknowledging 
status, caregiving, and disability components); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Re-
dux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1011–18 (2013) (fo-
cusing on pregnancy’s status and disability components); Joan C. Williams & 
Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrim-
ination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1311, 1313–16 (2008) (focusing on caregiving). 
 24. See Lawrence E. Gibson, What’s the Best Way to Treat Pregnancy Acne, 
MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/ 
pregnancy-week-by-week/expert-answers/pregnancy-acne/faq-20058045 
(“Some women . . . have trouble with acne during pregnancy.”); Second Tri-
mester Pregnancy: What to Expect, MAYO CLINIC (June 21, 2017), https://www 
.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/in-depth/pregnancy/ 
art-20047732 (describing a variety of skin changes that may occur during preg-
nancy). 
 25. See Terri Peters, Why Adele Grew a Beard: Facial Hair and Other Preg-
nancy Symptoms Explained, TODAY (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.today.com/ 
health/why-adele-grew-beard-facial-hair-other-pregnancy-symptoms-explained 
-t83366 (explaining increased hair growth during pregnancy); Pregnancy Nail 
and Hair Growth, WHAT TO EXPECT, https://www.whattoexpect.com/pregnancy/ 
hair-growth/ (last updated July 24, 2018) (describing possible changes in hair 
growth and patterns during pregnancy). 
 26. See Second Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, supra note 24 (noting 
that breast size increases throughout pregnancy). 
 27. See Neil A. Segal et al., Pregnancy Leads to Lasting Changes in Foot 
Structure, 92 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 232, 238 (2013) (“[P]reg-
nancy may lead to a permanent change in shoe size.”).  
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Weight gain is a hallmark symptom of pregnancy that is neces-
sary for growing a healthy child.28 Although the recommended 
weight gain for a pregnant woman depends upon her baseline 
weight and height,29 the average pregnant woman in the United 
States gains approximately thirty pounds over the course of her 
pregnancy.30 Such a weight gain is relatively dramatic for most 
women.  
Consider an American woman of average height, five feet, 
four inches tall, who weighs 145 pounds prior to pregnancy. A 
thirty-pound weight gain—which is not only the average weight 
gain, but also the recommended weight gain for someone of her 
size31—would increase her weight by more than twenty per-
cent.32 Prior scholarship has repeatedly documented how such a 
dramatic weight gain poses equally dramatic consequences for 
nonpregnant women in the labor market.33 The earliest scholar-
ship on weight gain in the labor market uniformly identified a 
negative association between weight, employment, and earn-
ings.34 The puzzle that challenged early empirical scholars was 
 
 28. Nicholas P. Deputy et al., Gestational Weight Gain—United States, 
2012 and 2013, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1215, 1215 (2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6443.pdf. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Jonetta L. Johnson et al., Trends in Gestational Weight Gain: The Preg-
nancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System, 2000–2009, 212 AM. J. OBSTETRI-
CIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 806.e1, 806.e3 tbl.1 (2015).  
 31. Physicians recommend that normal-weight women gain between 
twenty-five and thirty-five pounds over the course of a pregnancy. Deputy et al., 
supra note 28. 
 32. It would also temporarily shift her body mass index (BMI) classification 
from normal-weight to obese. BMI is a ratio of weight in kilograms to height in 
meters squared, which physicians use to classify individuals as underweight 
(18.5>BMI), normal weight (18.5≤BMI<25), overweight (25≤BMI<30), obese 
(30≤BMI<40), and morbidly obese (BMI≥40). Defining Adult Overweight and 
Obesity, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
obesity/adult/defining.html (last updated June 16, 2016). Note that this exam-
ple woman is of average height for U.S. women twenty to twenty-nine years old 
and slightly less-than-average weight for women twenty to twenty-nine years 
old (average is 149 pounds). CHERYL D. FRYAR ET AL., ANTHROPOMETRIC REF-
ERENCE DATA FOR CHILDREN AND ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2007–2010 (2012), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_11/sr11_252.pdf. 
 33. See John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RE-
SOURCES 451, 468 (2004) (indicating that heavier female workers earn less than 
their lighter-weight counterparts). 
 34. In other words, as weight increases, employment and earnings rates 
decrease. See id. at 451 (“Several previous studies have found, among females, 
a negative correlation between body weight and wages.”). 
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determining why this negative association existed.35  
On one hand, worse labor market outcomes endured by 
heavier individuals might be due to the health problems associ-
ated with weight gain, such as heart disease, diabetes, and mus-
culoskeletal impairments. These conditions could, in theory, re-
duce either the labor supply of heavier individuals—for example, 
heavier individuals removing themselves from the labor mar-
ket—or the labor demand of heavier individuals—for example, 
employer willingness to hire heavier individuals diminishing be-
cause of the associated higher costs or lower productivity—or 
both.36 On the other hand, worse labor market outcomes endured 
by heavier individuals might be the result of employers’ own per-
sonal preferences—or the perceived preferences of their custom-
ers—favoring thinner workers over heavier workers. This idea 
of an employer’s discriminatory preference that is unrelated to a 
worker’s underlying productivity is typically referred to as taste-
based discrimination.37  
After considering both hypotheses, more recent empirical 
scholarship has concluded that the weight penalty is larger and 
more robust for women than for men and appears to be, at least 
in part, driven by taste-based discrimination.38 Supporting these 
 
 35. See id. (exploring causal and non-causal explanations for the negative 
correlation between weight and wages). 
 36. For an in-depth discussion of these competing hypotheses, see generally 
Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal Frame-
work for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 101 (2016). 
 37. This term was first coined by labor economist Gary Becker. See GARY 
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971) (describing 
actions due to the “desire to be associated with some persons instead of others” 
as a “taste for discrimination”). 
 38. For example, a landmark 2004 study found that even after taking into 
account differences in education, demographics, socioeconomic status, and fa-
milial disposition towards weight gain in obese and nonobese individuals, the 
weight penalty persisted for obese women but disappeared for obese men. See 
Cawley, supra note 33, at 457–61 (taking familial disposition into account by 
comparing the outcomes of obese and nonobese siblings). Similarly, a 2016 study 
examined differences in the occupational characteristics of obese and nonobese 
workers and found that employers excluded obese women, but not obese men, 
from higher-paying jobs that required interaction with customers and with the 
public. See Shinall, supra note 36, at 134 (“As a woman moves up in BMI clas-
sification . . . she becomes less likely to work in a high-paying, public interaction 
job.”). In contrast, obese men and women were actually more likely than 
nonobese workers to work in lower-paying jobs requiring physical labor—de-
spite the correlation of obesity with the development of musculoskeletal condi-
tions. Id. at 133–34. Together, these findings led the author to conclude that 
obese women’s relative exclusion from certain types of jobs appeared to force 
them disproportionately into some of the most undesirable jobs in the labor mar-
ket—jobs that often required physical labor, had poor working conditions, and 
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findings are related studies from psychologists documenting the 
disparate social stigmatization of overweight and obese women, 
as compared to overweight and obese men.39 Taken together, the 
past decade of social science literature emphatically supports the 
conclusion that weight is a women’s issue.  
A related strand of literature, both empirical and nonempir-
ical, has developed on appearance discrimination.40 Economist 
Daniel Hamermesh pioneered much of the empirical literature 
on appearance discrimination, which has consistently found the 
existence of an “ugliness” penalty in both observational and ex-
perimental data.41 Beautiful people are more likely to be called 
 
were low-paying. Id. In fact, both the comparative burden of the weight penalty 
for female workers generally and the types of occupations in which the weight 
penalty remained most acute—made apparent by the 2016 study—called into 
question prior assumptions that the penalty was purely driven by employer cost 
concerns. Id. 
 39. For instance, a 2004 study found that obese women had a lower quality 
of life than obese men and reported higher levels of stigmatization in public. See 
Marney A. White et al., Gender, Race, and Obesity-Related Quality of Life at 
Extreme Levels of Obesity, 12 OBESITY RES. 949, 952 (2004) (illustrating the cor-
relation between BMI and quality of life across genders and races). Another 
study from 2010 asked participants to evaluate political candidates and found 
that subjects were quite critical of obese female candidates, but not of obese 
male candidates. See Beth J. Miller & Jennifer D. Lundgren, An Experimental 
Study of the Role of Weight Bias in Candidate Evaluation, 18 OBESITY 712, 715 
(2010) (“[O]bese female candidates were evaluated more negatively than 
nonobese female candidates. In contrast, obese male candidates were evaluated 
more positively than nonobese male candidates.”). Still another study from 2011 
that questioned adolescents about their attitudes on weight similarly revealed 
disturbing, gender-based conclusions: The male and female subjects made state-
ments such as, “[I would] rather be a fat guy than a fat girl,” and, “It’s more 
normal for guys to be overweight.” Nicole L. Taylor, “Guys, She’s Humongous!”: 
Gender and Weight-Based Teasing in Adolescence, 26 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 178, 
187 (2011). 
 40. Empirical evidence suggests that higher weight is negatively correlated 
with assessments of beauty and appearance. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Skin Color, 
Physical Appearance, and Perceived Discriminatory Treatment, 40 J. SOCIO-
ECON. 671, 674–77 (2011) (showing that for white females, black females, and 
white males surveyed in the Detroit Area Study, obesity had a negative impact 
on how observers rated their attractiveness). 
 41. See, e.g., Jeff E. Biddle & Daniel S. Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity, 
and Discrimination: Lawyers’ Looks and Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172, 190–96 
(1998) [hereinafter Lawyers’ Looks] (finding that attorneys who were rated bet-
ter looking based on their matriculation photographs earned more than their 
classmates); Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Mar-
ket, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1174, 1190–91 (1994) [hereinafter Labor Market] (find-
ing that there is both a wage penalty for plainness and a wage premium for 
beauty using observational data); see also DANIEL HAMERMESH, BEAUTY PAYS: 
WHY ATTRACTIVE PEOPLE ARE MORE SUCCESSFUL 39–84 (2011) (reviewing the 
existing evidence of a beauty premium for workers). 
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for an interview,42 to be employed,43 to earn more money,44 and 
to receive higher occupational performance ratings.45 Moreover, 
like weight discrimination (arguably a subcategory of appear-
ance discrimination),46 appearance discrimination in the work-
place appears to be driven by more than just employers’ produc-
tivity or cost concerns, and in some part by taste-based 
discrimination.47 
Taken together, the previous scholarship on appearance dis-
crimination indicates that, to the extent that pregnancy alters a 
woman’s appearance—whether her weight or some other as-
pect—lower wage and employment rates may ensue simply by 
virtue of this alteration, despite no accompanying decline in the 
woman’s capabilities or efficiency.48 Well-known is the appear-
ance-based employment penalty for nonpregnant women in the 
labor market; what remains unknown is whether this penalty 
also holds for pregnant women. Certainly, there are reasons to 
question whether the appearance penalty holds for pregnant 
 
 42. See Dan-Olof Rooth, Obesity, Attractiveness, and Differential Treatment 
in Hiring: A Field Experiment, 44 J. HUM. RESOURCES 710, 711–12, 714–16 
(2009) (finding that applications sent to real job openings in Sweden with a pho-
tograph manipulated to make the male and female applicants look obese were 
six and eight percent less likely, respectively, to be called for an interview than 
identical applications sent with an unmanipulated photograph). 
 43. See, e.g., Labor Market, supra note 41, at 1188 (“[There is] some evi-
dence that women select themselves out of the labor force if they are particularly 
unattractive.”). 
 44. See id. at 1190–91 (finding that there is both a wage penalty for plain-
ness and a wage premium for beauty); Lawyers’ Looks, supra note 41, at 193–
95 (finding that attorneys rated better looking based on their matriculation pho-
tographs earn more than their worse looking classmates). 
 45. See Daniel Hamermesh & Amy Parker, Beauty in the Classroom: In-
structors’ Pulchritude and Putative Pedagogical Productivity, 24 ECON. EDUC. 
REV. 369, 372–73 (2005) (finding that better looking university instructors re-
ceive higher student ratings). 
 46. Cf. Hersch, supra note 40, at 671 (“[E]xcess weight is considered less 
attractive.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Rooth, supra note 42, at 714–16 (finding that employers are 
less likely to interview candidates who appear obese, even if they have the same 
qualifications as a non-obese candidate). 
 48. While this alteration in appearance and/or weight is likely to be tempo-
rary, pregnancy may have long-term effects on a woman’s appearance. For ex-
ample, up to three-quarters of women may be heavier one year postpartum than 
pre-pregnancy. Loraine K. Endres et al., Postpartum Weight Retention Risk Fac-
tors and Relationship to Obesity at One Year, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
144, 144 (2015). Fifteen percent of women may experience “major” pregnancy-
related weight retention two years postpartum. Leah M. Lipsky et al., Maternal 
Weight Change Between One and Two Years Postpartum: The Importance of One 
Year Weight Retention, 20 OBESITY 1496, 1498 (2012). 
  
760 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:749 
 
women since, unlike many others who gain weight, pregnant 
women’s weight gain (or other appearance changes) are more 
likely to be viewed both as having a sound basis and as nonper-
manent. To the extent that the appearance penalty carries for-
ward to pregnant women, however, it would contribute to the 
pregnancy penalty since almost all pregnant women gain weight. 
Of course, pregnancy’s effects on appearance may not be the sole 
driver of poor labor market outcomes; the next Section explores 
other short-term consequences of pregnancy with possible work-
place implications. 
2. Pregnancy as Disability Inducing 
As discussed in the prior Section, weight gain is an expected 
and necessary part of pregnancy for almost all women.49 But for 
many women, pregnancy additionally leads to the development 
of secondary health conditions, including diabetes,50 high blood 
pressure,51 and musculoskeletal disorders.52 Developing a sec-
ondary condition related to pregnancy is quite common; for ex-
ample, as many as fourteen percent of pregnant women will de-
velop gestational diabetes,53 six to ten percent will suffer from 
gestational high blood pressure,54 and fifty percent will be af-
flicted with lower back pain.55 Such conditions have the potential 
to substantially limit a major life activity, including working. In 
other words, pregnancy may induce a disability—albeit a tempo-
rary one—that may affect a woman’s ability to work. Thus, to 
the extent that a pregnancy penalty exists in the labor market, 
it may be at least partially driven by employers’ reactions to 
pregnancy-induced disability. 
Being disabled at work, at least in the absence of pregnancy, 
is associated with its own wage and employment penalty. Well-
documented is the fact that disabled individuals continue to fare 
 
 49. See Deputy et al., supra note 28 (“The weight a woman gains during 
pregnancy, known as gestational weight gain . . . , has important health impli-
cations for both mother and child.”). 
 50. Shin Y. Kim et al., Percentage of Gestational Diabetes Mellitus Attribut-
able to Overweight and Obesity, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1047, 1047 (2010). 
 51. Evangelia Kintiraki et al., Pregnancy-Induced Hypertension, 14 HOR-
MONES 211, 212 (2015). 
 52. E.g., P. Katonis et al., Pregnancy-Related Low Back Pain, 15 HIPPOKRA-
TIA 205, 209 (2011) (discussing back problems as “one of the most common mus-
culoskeletal complaints of pregnant women”). 
 53. Kim et al., supra note 50.  
 54. Kintiraki et al., supra note 51.  
 55. Katonis et al., supra note 52, at 205.  
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worse than nondisabled individuals in the labor market; depend-
ing on the nature of their condition, disabled individuals are be-
tween twenty and thirty percentage points less likely to be em-
ployed than are nondisabled individuals.56 Even when disabled 
individuals find employment, they earn fifteen to twenty percent 
less than similarly qualified, nondisabled individuals.57 Less 
than half of the disability wage and employment penalty is at-
tributable to actual productivity differences between the disa-
bled and nondisabled; similar to weight and appearance, the rest 
of the penalty appears to be driven by taste-based discrimina-
tion.58 Furthermore, some evidence suggests that this penalty 
exists not only for individuals with actual disabilities but also for 
individuals with perceived disabilities.59 
The disability penalty is long-standing,60 persisting—and by 
some accounts, even worsening61 —in the decades since the pas-
sage of the ADA. Moreover, a growing body of empirical evidence 
suggests that the disability penalty in the labor market may be 
 
 56. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrim-
ination Against Men with Disabilities in the Year of the ADA, 66 S. ECON. J. 548, 
559 (2000) [hereinafter Year of the ADA] (finding an employment differential 
between eighteen and thirty-one percentage points in the year of the ADA); 
Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination 
Against Women with Disabilities, 34 INDUS. REL. 555, 575 (1995) [hereinafter 
Women with Disabilities] (finding an employment differential of twenty-seven 
percentage points for women). 
 57. See Year of the ADA, supra note 56, at 557 (finding a wage differential 
between nineteen and twenty-eight percent for men); Women with Disabilities, 
supra note 56, at 571 (finding a wage differential of 11.7% for women). 
 58. Year of the ADA, supra note 56, at 558; Women with Disabilities, supra 
note 56, at 571. This calculation of the magnitude of taste-based discrimination 
is made even after the authors take into account the possible supply-side effects 
of disabled workers. 
 59. For a discussion of protections based on perceived disability, as opposed 
to actual disability, see Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Differ-
ence: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 
(2004) (analogizing discrimination on the basis of perceived physical disability 
to discrimination on the basis of sex and color, which was justified at one time 
on the basis of perceived physical differences). 
 60. See Year of the ADA, supra note 56 (finding an employment differential 
between eighteen and thirty-one percentage points in the year of the ADA). 
 61. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employ-
ment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. 
ECON. 915, 929–33 (2001) (finding that the ADA likely caused decreased em-
ployment rates of disabled workers); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employ-
ment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 
701 (2000) (finding a decline in employment of disabled men following the pas-
sage of the ADA). 
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more severe for disabled women than for disabled men.62 Alt-
hough some of the disability penalty may be driven by supply-
side effects—that is, disabled individuals’ unwillingness (or ina-
bility) to work in certain types of jobs—available evidence indi-
cates that at least some of the penalty is driven by demand-side 
effects—that is, employers’ unwillingness to employ disabled 
workers in certain types of jobs.63 Such demand-side effects may 
be driven by a multitude of employer concerns, including the 
costs, productivity, appearance, and abilities of disabled work-
ers.64 
As a result, if pregnancy limits a woman’s physical activities 
and induces disability (or even creates the perception of disabil-
ity),65 then prior empirical scholarship suggests her wages and 
employment outcomes may suffer.66 Similar to the weight pen-
alty and appearance penalty, there are reasons to question 
whether the disability penalty, widely documented in the non-
pregnant population, would extend to the pregnant population. 
Pregnancy-related limitations, whether actual or perceived, are 
 
 62. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 61, at 932 (finding that the ADA 
had more positive employment effects for disabled men than for disabled 
women); Kathleen Beegle & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disa-
bility Discrimination Laws, 38 J. HUM. RESOURCES 806, 857 (2003) (finding a 
small negative effect of discrimination laws on female employment rates but not 
on male employment rates); Jennifer Bennett Shinall, The Substantially Im-
paired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of Disability Discrimination, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2017) (noting that the number of ADA charges filed 
per female worker are consistently higher than the number of ADA charges filed 
per male worker). 
 63. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 61, at 941 (discussing data 
“show[ing] a sizable decline in the hiring rates of [certain] disabled workers”). 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 922 (describing how “firms can ‘accommodate’ disabled 
workers at [a certain] cost . . . per worker . . . by purchasing special equipment” 
in order to “increase[ ]  the marginal productivity of disabled workers”); Bradley 
A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1164 (2016) (dis-
cussing the perception that a “disability status expresses an inability to work”); 
c.f. Marjorie L. Baldwin & Chung Choe, Wage Discrimination Against Workers 
with Sensory Disabilities, 53 INDUS. REL. 101, 122 (2014) (concluding that indi-
viduals with sensory disabilities are particularly disadvantaged in employment 
because of their appearances, given “the high visibility of the conditions”). 
 65. Note that the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of both actual 
limitation and perceived limitation. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(a) (2012) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being 
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or 
she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an 
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment.”). 
 66. See Year of the ADA, supra note 56, at 557 (finding a wage differential 
between nineteen and twenty-eight percent for men); Women with Disabilities, 
supra note 56, at 571 (finding a wage differential of 11.7% for women). 
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more likely to be nonpermanent.67 Nonetheless, if the disability 
penalty does extend to the pregnant population, it could be quite 
problematic since pregnancy-related activity limitations remain 
common. Although concerns regarding pregnancy’s short-term 
inducement of disability and appearance changes likely grow as 
a woman approaches full term, they typically subside postpar-
tum. Nonetheless, pregnancy also has significant long-term ef-
fects, which is the focus of the next Section. 
B. LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF PREGNANCY 
1. Pregnancy as Care Increasing 
A well-known saying proclaims that a parent’s work is never 
done.68 While the amount of work required to raise children may 
ebb and flow, having a dependent is, by definition, more time-
consuming than not having a dependent,69 and a household’s 
caretaking responsibilities must inevitably increase with the ar-
rival of a new child. Pregnancy then becomes a signal that an 
expectant mother’s household responsibilities will soon increase. 
How these new responsibilities are divided among members of 
the expectant mother’s household is not necessarily a foregone 
conclusion. Although once the norm, mothers now need not stay 
home to care for their children, nor must they even be the pri-
mary caregivers of their children. Indeed, more than half of chil-
dren under the age of five have mothers who remain employed.70 
Nannies, day care centers, fathers, and other relatives commonly 
alleviate at least some parental caretaking responsibilities.71  
 
 67. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES NO. 915.003 (2015), https:// 
www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/pregnancy_guidance.pdf (“[It] is likely that 
a number of pregnancy-related impairments that impose work-related re-
strictions will be substantially limiting, even though they are only temporary.”). 
 68. See Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes, A Family’s Work Is Never Done, AGENDA 
(Dec. 14, 2011), http://agingandwork.bc.edu/blog/a-familys-work-is-never-done. 
 69. See Dependent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster 
.com/dictionary/dependent (last updated Sept. 14, 2018) (defining “dependent” 
as “a person who relies on another for support”). 
 70. LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO’S MINDING THE KIDS? 
CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS: SPRING 2011 3 tbl.2 (2013), https://www.census 
.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-135.pdf. 
 71. Id. at 3–4. 
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And yet, as much as the traditional norm of mothers staying 
at home with their children has eroded over the past half cen-
tury,72 it remains prevalent.73 In 2012, 10.4 million mothers 
stayed home with their children—a number that trounces the 
mere two million fathers who stayed home.74 Furthermore, in 
2011, just twenty-one percent of fathers served as their chil-
dren’s primary caretaker.75 An employer’s assumption that the 
primary caretaking burden of a new child will fall on the 
woman76 will, more often than not, have some validity.77  
The persistent intertwining of gender and care responsibili-
ties has led both scholars and advocates to characterize care-
taker discrimination as a form of impermissible sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.78 A number of courts have agreed that 
caretaker discrimination can be a form of illegal sex stereotyp-
ing,79 and in 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) issued Title VII enforcement guidance aimed at cur-
tailing discrimination on the basis of family responsibilities.80 
Despite this recent legal push to reduce employer discrimination 
on the basis of caretaking responsibilities, empirical scholars 
have estimated that, on average, mothers still earn at least three 
percent less than nonmothers in similar jobs.81 This so-called 
 
 72. See Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: 
Information Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 57 (2016) 
(“At the time of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act . . . employment of mothers 
of young children was rare. Now it is entirely the norm.”). 
 73. See id. at 56. 
 74. Id. 
 75. LAUGHLIN, supra note 70, at 21. 
 76. See Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Pen-
alty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1298 (2007) (finding that “women with children 
[are] viewed as less competent and less committed to work”). 
 77. This is often referred to as “statistical discrimination.” Id. at 1302 n.2 
(explaining that “statistical discrimination theories assume rational actors re-
lying on biased information”). 
 78. Hersch & Shinall, supra note 72, at 63 (“[D]iscrimination on the basis 
of a sex stereotype is discrimination on the basis of sex. As such, sex stereotyp-
ing claims are cognizable under Title VII.”). 
 79. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 23, at 1318 nn.52 & 55, 1319 n.65. 
 80. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSI-
BILITIES NO. 915.002 (2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf. 
 81. See, e.g., Deborah J. Anderson et al., The Motherhood Wage Penalty Re-
visited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility, 
56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 273, 291 (2003) (finding a three to five percent wage 
penalty for mothers); Correll et al., supra note 76, at 1297 (“[T]he audit data 
show that mothers are disadvantaged when actual employers make hiring de-
cisions.”). 
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“motherhood penalty”82 may have several potential causes, in-
cluding perceptions that mothers have greater demands at home 
(thus constraining their abilities to give into work demands),83 
beliefs that mothers take their careers less seriously, notions 
that mothers have different personality traits,84 and personal 
views that mothers should be at home with their children.85 Note 
that these views, notions, beliefs, and perceptions may or may 
not be grounded in fact.  
Certainly, the causes of the pregnancy penalty must overlap 
to some extent with the causes of the motherhood penalty, but 
the two penalties should not perfectly overlap. Since a pregnant 
woman’s child has not been born, pregnancy signals potential 
near-future changes—changes that have not presently arrived. 
More concretely, to the extent that the motherhood penalty is 
driven by actual increases in a woman’s housework and caretak-
ing responsibilities,86 it would not explain the pregnancy pen-
alty, as such greater responsibilities would have not yet begun. 
Still, to the extent that motherhood induces concern in employ-
ers regarding a female worker’s current workplace productivity 
because of household demands, pregnancy will unavoidably in-
duce concern in employers regarding a female worker’s antici-
pated future workplace productivity because of future household 
demands.  
In sum, the pregnancy penalty may be an extension of the 
well-known and previously explored motherhood penalty in the 
 
 82. Social scientists have repeatedly documented both a motherhood pen-
alty and a fatherhood premium in the labor market; that is, mothers have worse 
wage and employment outcomes than nonmothers, while fathers have better 
wage and employment outcomes than nonfathers. See, e.g., id. at 1332 (docu-
menting employer discrimination against mothers, but not fathers); Rebecca 
Glauber, Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Pre-
mium, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 8 (2008) (exploring differences in wage premiums 
for fathers of diverse races and ethnicities). 
 83. Correll et al., supra note 76, at 1306 (explaining that because modern 
society “assumes that the ‘good mother’ will direct her time and emotional en-
ergy to her children . . . [she] must give less effort and priority to work de-
mands”). 
 84. Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth 
Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 709–10 (2004) (finding that subjects 
view mothers as having more warmth, but less competence). 
 85. See infra Part I.B.2; cf. Hersch & Shinall, supra note 72, at 56 (suggest-
ing that traditional beliefs about the importance of women in raising children 
persist). 
 86. Cf. Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the Amer-
ican Time Use Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159, 166 (2009) (documenting 
that the average married woman spends 28.76 minutes on childcare every day, 
but the average married man spends only 15.67 minutes). 
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labor market. To the extent that the pregnancy penalty is related 
to the motherhood penalty, it may be based upon employer con-
cerns about the long-term caretaking constraints that accom-
pany the birth of a child, as explored in this Section. Alterna-
tively, the pregnancy penalty may be bound up with value 
judgments about the role of women and motherhood, which are 
briefly explored in the next Section. 
2. Pregnancy as Value Incompatible 
Employers may make value judgments about a working 
woman’s decision to become a parent given her life situation; 
they may view this decision as irresponsible, immoral, or simply 
the wrong choice.87 Such value judgments may be based in a 
range of beliefs about morals, ethics, religion, politics, and gen-
der norms. To the extent that pregnant women fail to conform to 
their employers’ ideas about appropriate behavior, this value-in-
compatibility could provide another source of the pregnancy pen-
alty that would not go away after childbirth.88 This value-incom-
patibility could be based on disapproval of mothers in the 
workplace generally; disapproval of a woman’s marital or rela-
tionship status, financial status, or age; or disapproval of the sex, 
race, or ethnicity of the woman’s partner.  
Moreover, value-incompatibility may influence both the em-
ployer and the worker. An employer’s values might conflict with 
a working mother’s decision to become pregnant, which would 
create a labor demand-side issue, and potentially, an employ-
ment discrimination issue. A pregnant worker’s own values 
might also conflict with mothers remaining in the workforce, 
which would create a labor supply-side issue. 
The idea that employers or workers may maintain restric-
tive value judgments regarding pregnancy—and its natural suc-
cessor, motherhood—may seem outmoded. Yet a multitude of 
popular examples reveal the prevalence of the value judgments 
that continue to surround motherhood, including the “Mommy 
 
 87. Widiss, supra note 23, at 1036 (explaining that those who opposed the 
PWFA believed that it would allow pregnant women “to ‘shift the burdens’ of 
their ‘lifestyle choice’ to others”). 
 88. Some evidence from the psychology literature supports the idea that 
inherent biases accompany the status of being pregnant. See, e.g., id. at 965, 
972–73 (discussing the “prevalent misconceptions regarding pregnant women’s 
capacity and commitment to work”). 
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Wars,”89 the “abstinence movement,”90 the defense of marriage 
as between one man and one woman,91 and criticisms of so-called 
“welfare queens.”92 Compounding these conflicting values is the 
unmistakable and unavoidable nature of pregnancy as a woman 
progresses to term. A visibly pregnant woman who continues to 
work makes a statement—and in a sense, advertises to the 
world—as to the side of these public debates on which she falls.93  
Despite the prevalence of such value judgments, employers’ 
and employees’ beliefs on these issues may not be discussed 
openly and, thus, may remain ambiguous within the workplace. 
This ambiguity has been, in many ways, exacerbated by employ-
ment discrimination laws and the EEOC’s guidance surrounding 
these laws.94 In an effort to protect women from caretaking-re-
lated discrimination in the workplace, the agency’s guidance dis-
courages employers and employees from having honest conver-
sations about family responsibilities and family values.95 
 
 89. See Mommy vs. Mommy, NEWSWEEK (June 3, 1990), https://www 
.newsweek.com/mommy-vs-mommy-206132 (describing the “Mommy Wars” as 
a conflict of “[t]ension between mothers” who go to work and mothers who stay 
home); Brandy Zadrozny, Yes, ‘Stay-at-Home Mom’ Is a Job: The Return of the 
‘Mommy Wars’, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
yes-stay-at-home-mom-is-a-job-the-return-of-the-mommy-wars (debating 
whether being a stay-at-home mom is a job). 
 90. See generally Jean Calterone Williams, Battling a ‘Sex-Saturated Soci-
ety’: The Abstinence Movement and the Politics of Sex Education, 14 SEXUALI-
TIES 416 (2011) (discussing the sector of the Christian Right that advocates for 
abstinence before marriage). 
 91. See Ryan T. Anderson, In Defense of Marriage, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 
20, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/commentary/defense 
-marriage (arguing that marriage should be between one man and one woman). 
 92. See Rachel Black & Aleta Sprague, The ‘Welfare Queen’ Is a Lie, ATLAN-
TIC (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/09/ 
welfare-queen-myth/501470 (arguing that the perception that there are individ-
uals getting rich off of public benefits is a myth). 
 93. The importance of a health condition’s visibility has been well explored 
in the disability literature, which consistently finds that more visible health 
conditions have more negative employment effects. See Baldwin & Choe, supra 
note 64 (concluding that individuals with sensory disabilities are particularly 
disadvantaged in employment because of “the high visibility of the conditions”); 
Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and 
Capitalism, 15 POL’Y STUD. J. 551, 560–61 (1987) (finding that visible conditions 
have particularly negative effects on women’s outcomes because of societal pres-
sures with respect to women’s appearances). 
 94. See Hersch & Shinall, supra note 72, at 61–70 (explaining that while 
the U.S. Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether family-status in-
quiries are discriminatory, some federal courts have recognized that they can 
be considered as sex-stereotyping and sex-plus discrimination). 
 95. See, e.g., Pre-Employment Inquiries and Marital Status or Number of 
Children, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
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Although well-intentioned, the guidance promotes an atmos-
phere in which pregnant women have no insight into employers’ 
views towards working mothers (and often assume the worst), 
and employers are left guessing about a pregnant woman’s true 
intentions postpartum (and often assume the worst).96  
In sum, pregnancy may negatively impact labor market out-
comes for at least four separate reasons: changes in appearance, 
changes in physical ability, value judgments about the decision 
to become pregnant, and actual or perceived increases in house-
hold caretaking demands. Some or all of these short- and long-
term factors may work in combination to produce a pregnancy 
penalty for women in the labor market. To the extent that 
women actually experience discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy by employers, the next Part briefly reviews the framework 
of federal remedies against such discrimination as well as schol-
arly assessments of their adequacy. 
II.  THE FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE 
PREGNANCY PENALTY   
By all accounts, legal protections for pregnant women in the 
workplace have come a long way. Only a few decades ago, laying 
off, demoting, and firing women due to pregnancy was not only 
legal, it was socially acceptable.97 Indeed, pregnant women 
lacked any workplace protections at the federal level until 1978, 
when Congress passed the PDA.98 The PDA amended Title VII 
 
laws/practices/inquiries_marital_status.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) (“Ques-
tions about marital status and number and ages of children are frequently used 
to discriminate against women and may violate Title VII if used to deny or limit 
employment opportunities. It is clearly discriminatory to ask such questions 
only of women and not men (or vice-versa). Even if asked of both men and 
women, such questions may be seen as evidence of intent to discriminate 
against, for example, women with children.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Indeed, employers commonly viewed pregnancy as a condition to be 
avoided in the workplace—not only because of the motherhood caregiving re-
sponsibilities that would directly ensue (and could potentially interfere with a 
woman’s availability for work), but also because the mere sight of a working 
pregnant woman was socially taboo. Accord Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Tra-
ditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1360 (2012) 
(“Historically, women’s capacity to become pregnant and their status as moth-
ers have served as central justifications for their exclusion from the work-
force.”). 
 98. The PDA was a direct reaction by Congress to overturn General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), in which the Supreme Court had concluded 
that pregnancy discrimination was not a form of impermissible sex discrimina-
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by adding supplemental definitional language to the statute, 
specifying that the phrase “discrimination . . . because of sex” 
signifies discrimination  
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, includ-
ing receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons 
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.99 
Today, although the PDA remains the only federal statute 
that explicitly protects pregnant women from employment dis-
crimination, a second employment discrimination law is availa-
ble, in theory, to at least some pregnant women. Title I of the 
ADA, passed in 1990, requires employers to provide “reasonable 
accommodation” for disabled workers, unless such accommoda-
tion will create an “undue hardship”100 for the employer.101 The 
definition of disability for the purposes of the ADA is at once 
broad and particular; anyone who is “substantially limit[ed in] 
one or more major life activities,” who is “regarded as” substan-
tially limited, or who has “a record of such an impairment” is 
disabled for the purposes of the Act.102 Thus, in order to qualify 
for coverage under the ADA, an expectant mother would have to 
prove that her pregnancy (or related health condition) substan-
tially limited her in a major life activity or caused others to per-
ceive her as substantially limited.  
In reviewing the state of protections for pregnancy under 
federal law, Part II.A begins by reviewing recent coverage ex-
pansions in the ADA that may be extended to an increasing num-
 
tion under Title VII. According to the Court, discrimination because of preg-
nancy was not discrimination because of sex under Title VII because pregnancy 
discrimination classified workers “into two groups—pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. While the first group [wa]s exclusively female, the second 
include[d] members of both sexes.” Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974)). 
 99. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 100. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)–(10) 
(2012). 
 101. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is interpreted analogously to the ADA 
for the purposes of determining a reasonable accommodation. See Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012) (“The standards used to determine 
whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment dis-
crimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . .”). However, the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 applies to disabled workers employed by the federal government or a 
federal contractor whereas the ADA applies to all other workers, public and pri-
vate. See id. § 794(a); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
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ber of pregnant women. Part II.B reviews even more recent cov-
erage expansions in the PDA, and Part II.C reviews proposals 
for future expansions in federal employment laws to protect 
pregnant women. 
A. EXPANDING PROTECTIONS UNDER THE ADA 
Over the past decade, the reach of both the PDA and the 
ADA has expanded to protect additional pregnant women—at 
least in theory. For the first fifteen years of the ADA’s existence, 
few courts found any pregnant women (even those with preg-
nancy-related complications) disabled for the purposes of the 
Act, mirroring a larger trend among federal courts of taking an 
exceptionally narrow view of the term “disability” with respect 
to all health conditions.103 Courts were able to take this narrow 
view of the Act’s coverage because Congress had failed to define 
several key terms within the statutory definition of disability—
including the terms “substantially limited” and “regarded as”—
and Congress had also failed to provide rules of construction 
within the 1990 version of the ADA.104 In turn, federal courts 
typically rejected the notion of pregnancy as a disability because 
 
 103. This limiting case law culminated with the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in the Sutton trilogy of cases in 1999 and Toyota in 2002. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 (2002) (holding that ADA disabilities 
must be “long[-]term” in nature); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
488 (1999) (holding that corrective and mitigating measures taken by an indi-
vidual should be considered when determining if he or she is disabled under the 
ADA); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566–67 (1999) (holding 
that disability under the ADA must be proven on a case-by-case basis with in-
dividualized evidence of a substantial limitation on a major life activity); Mur-
phy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999) (requiring ADA plaintiffs 
to demonstrate they were “unable to perform a class of jobs”); see also Jennifer 
Bennett Shinall, What Happens When the Definition of Disability Changes? The 
Case of Obesity, 5 IZA J. LAB. ECON. 1, 2 (2016) (discussing “decisions by the US 
Supreme Court and federal appellate courts that had severely limited coverage 
under the ADA” in the context of coverage for obesity). 
 104. Accord Shinall, supra note 103, at 2 (“Congress failed to define what the 
terms ‘impairment,’ ‘substantially limits,’ ‘major life activities,’ and ‘regarded 
as’ precisely meant. Nor did Congress provide any rules of construction for the 
undefined terms in the ADA. As a result, years of litigation ensued over the 
meanings of these terms . . . .”). 
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pregnancy was neither “permanent”105 nor a “disorder”106—de-
spite the fact that these qualifiers were not included within the 
statutory language of the ADA,107 and despite the fact that the 
 
 105. From the ADA’s inception, lower courts consistently asserted that “tem-
porary” conditions could not be disabilities for the purposes of the ADA. See, 
e.g., Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Disability does 
not include temporary medical conditions.”); Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 
(7th Cir. 1995) (“Under the ADA, ‘[i]ntermittent, episodic impairments are not 
disabilities.’” (quoting Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 
(7th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original))); Gorman v. Wells Mfg. 
Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (“The Court regards as com-
mon knowledge that all of these symptoms, at some degree of severity, 
are . . . too short-term to qualify as a disability under the ADA.”). Such holdings 
often relied on EEOC regulations stating as much. See Americans with Disabil-
ities Act of 1990, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1992) (“[T]emporary, non-chronic 
impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, 
are usually not disabilities.”). These early interpretations were further solidi-
fied by the 2002 Supreme Court decision, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Ken-
tucky, Inc., 534 U.S. at 185, which confirmed that an “impairment’s impact must 
also be permanent or long term” in order to be a disability under the Act. 
 106. Pre-ADA Amendments Act, courts were hesitant to classify any nondis-
ordered health status as a disability, regardless of its actual effects on an indi-
vidual’s abilities. Again, this interpretation of the ADA relied on restrictive 
EEOC regulations that linked disability to “disorder,” and even went on to use 
pregnancy as a specific example of health conditions that would generally not 
qualify as a disability for the purposes of the Act. See Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1996) (“[C]onditions, such as preg-
nancy, that are not the result of a physiological disorder are . . . not impair-
ments.”). Courts pigeonholed pregnancy as a “normal” health condition and, as 
a result, dismissed it as a possible disability under the ADA, often without con-
sidering its actual limiting effects. See, e.g., Gabriel v. City of Chicago, 9 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“[M]any courts have held that pregnancy, 
absent abnormal or unusual circumstances, is not a disability.”); Hernandez v. 
City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997) (“Pregnancy and related 
medical conditions have been held not to be physical impairments.”); Cerrato v. 
Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[C]ourts have distinguished 
between a normal, uncomplicated pregnancy itself and a complication or condi-
tion arising out of the pregnancy and have found that, under particular circum-
stances, the pregnancy-related condition can constitute a ‘disability’ within the 
meaning of the ADA.”). 
 107. One issue that did not arise under the ADA with respect to pregnancy 
is its voluntary nature. From the beginning, the ADA has never distinguished 
between voluntary and involuntary disabilities, perhaps because the inquiry 
into whether or how much an individual contributed to their disability is often 
a complex one. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND HIRING POLICE OFFICERS (1997), 
https://www.ada.gov/copsq7a.pdf (“An alcoholic is a person with a disability and 
is protected by the ADA if he or she is qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of the job.”). 
  
772 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:749 
 
activities of expectant mothers could be severely restricted, al-
beit temporarily.108 The result of these restrictive judicial inter-
pretations was that only the most troublesome pregnancies, 
which altered a woman’s abilities even beyond the gestation pe-
riod, were able to present a colorable claim of disability during 
the first two decades of the Act.109 
Much to the elation of pregnancy advocates and disability 
advocates more generally, these prior judicial decisions were 
soundly overturned in 2008 by Congress’s passage of the ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA). Indeed, the preamble to the ADAAA 
specifically states that its key purposes were to “reject” federal 
courts’ prior restrictive reasoning110 and, in its place, to foster 
judicial construction of the ADA “in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals under th[e Act], to the maximum extent permit-
ted.”111 In light of the ADAAA, subsequent decisions from lower 
federal courts have been more generous towards pregnant 
women,112 recognizing rights to reasonable accommodation in 
 
 108. Accord Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 460 (2012) (“These courts 
reasoned that pregnancy imposed functional limitations that are too minor and 
short-term to constitute an ADA disability.”); Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of 
Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 109 (2013) (“Prior to the ADAAA, many courts held 
that pregnancy-related impairments that subsided shortly after the termina-
tion of pregnancy and left no lasting harm were not substantially limiting.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Gabriel, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (suggesting that only pregnancies 
in danger of complications like “premature rupture of membranes, vaginal 
bleeding, . . . [and] risk of premature [birth]” could be considered disabilities un-
der the ADA (quoting Hernandez, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 130) (second alteration in 
original))); Patterson ex rel. Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 278 
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff ’s pregnancy-related back pain was a 
disability under the ADA because her “back pain was also attributable in part 
to the aggravation of a prior back injury”); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc., 
893 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D.N.H. 1995) (“Although plaintiff ’s pregnancy was 
clearly complicated by her ovarian cysts, and these complications required her 
to be out of work for a period of time, the court finds that plaintiff ’s pregnancy 
was not a ‘disability’ under the ADA.”), abrogated by Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 
261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Williams et al., supra note 108, at 110 (“Un-
der this [former] interpretation, a pregnant woman seeking ADA protection had 
to prove that her limitations stemmed from a medical condition that predated 
her pregnancy and was exacerbated by it.”). 
 110. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3) (2012)) (enumerating that one 
of the stated purposes of the ADAAA was to “reject the Supreme Court’s reason-
ing” in Toyota and the Sutton trilogy). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a) (2012). 
 112. See, e.g., Alexander v. Trilogy Health Servs., LLC, No. 1:11-cv-295, 2012 
WL 5268701, at *11–12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff ’s 
“pregnancy-related hypertension” was a disability under the ADA). 
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the workplace as a result of pregnancy-related complications, in-
cluding lifting and activity restrictions,113 breaks,114 and time 
away from the office due to mandatory bed rest.115 The EEOC’s 
post-ADAAA amended guidance, issued in 2015, reflects this ap-
parent broadening of the ADA’s availability to pregnant women. 
It asserts that “some pregnant workers may have impairments 
related to their pregnancies that qualify as disabilities under the 
ADA,” and “[a] pregnant employee may be entitled to reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA for limitations resulting from 
pregnancy-related conditions.”116 Similar to the ADA, the PDA 
 
 113. See, e.g., Khan v. Midwestern Univ., 147 F. Supp. 3d 718, 722–23 (N.D. 
Ill. 2015) (holding that a pregnant “plaintiff ’s medical note, which stated that 
she should only engage in light duty and refrain from heavy lifting, was suffi-
cient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether her pregnancy qualified 
her as disabled under the ADA”); Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. 
Supp. 2d 913, 920–21 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (finding evidence that plaintiff ’s high-risk 
pregnancy limited her ability to work long hours and lift heavy objects was suf-
ficient “to create a triable issue of fact as to whether [she was] disabled under 
the ADAAA”). 
 114. See, e.g., Varone v. Great Wolf Lodge of the Poconos, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-
304, 2016 WL 1393393, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2016) (denying a motion to dis-
miss an ADA claim based on an employer’s decision not to provide medically 
prescribed work breaks to a pregnant massage therapist). 
 115. See, e.g., Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 119 F. Supp. 
3d 807, 818 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (finding a genuine issue of material fact regard-
ing whether allowing a pregnant plaintiff to work remotely due to physician-
mandated bed rest would cause her employer an undue hardship); Nayak v. St. 
Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-0817-RLY-MJD, 2013 WL 
121838, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff who was ordered 
to bed rest for twelve days during her pregnancy had pled a plausible claim for 
disability discrimination). 
 116. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 67 (“Prior to the 
enactment of the ADAAA, some courts held that medical conditions related to 
pregnancy generally were not impairments within the meaning of the ADA, and 
so could not be disabilities. Although pregnancy itself is not an impairment 
within the meaning of the ADA, and thus is never on its own a disability, some 
pregnant workers may have impairments related to their pregnancies that qual-
ify as disabilities under the ADA, as amended. An impairment’s cause is not 
relevant in determining whether the impairment is a disability. Moreover, un-
der the amended ADA, it is likely that a number of pregnancy-related impair-
ments that impose work-related restrictions will be substantially limiting, even 
though they are only temporary.”); see also Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 
81 Fed. Reg. 39,108, 39,108 (June 15, 2016) (codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-20) 
(issuing revised, stronger Department of Labor regulations on pregnancy dis-
crimination, including pregnancy accommodation requirements, for federal con-
tractors). In contrast, the EEOC guidance prior to the 2008 ADAAA held that 
pregnancy was not a disability for the purposes of the ADA unless it caused or 
exacerbated “a physiological disorder.” Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1996). 
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has also undergone an expansion in recent years, as reviewed in 
the next Section. 
B. EXPANDING PROTECTIONS UNDER THE PDA 
As with the ADA, judicial interpretations of the PDA have 
recently shifted towards broader coverage. Historically, a great 
deal of pregnancy-related litigation has turned on what it means 
for “women affected by pregnancy . . . [to] be treated the 
same . . . as other persons . . . similar in their ability or inability 
to work.”117 This phrase, on its face, invites a comparison be-
tween a pregnant worker and a nonpregnant worker.118 Even 
though courts widely rely on such comparator evidence119 in em-
ployment discrimination cases, whether the cases are preg-
nancy-related or not, courts continue to struggle with such evi-
dence.120 In all employment discrimination cases that rely on 
comparator evidence to prove discrimination, a comparator may 
not exist because an employer is too small to have more than one 
 
 117. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2012). 
 118. Cf. Williams et al., supra note 108, at 105 (“While not specifically re-
quiring the accommodation of pregnancy-related conditions, the plain statutory 
language thus requires that employers place pregnant women with impair-
ments on the same footing as nonpregnant workers with similar impair-
ments.”). 
 119. In the absence of any direct or smoking-gun statements from the em-
ployer, proving an employment discrimination case is often attempted via a sim-
ilarly situated comparator—that is, providing evidence of another employee 
who is similarly situated to the plaintiff in all respects except membership in a 
protected class, but was treated better by the employer. Accord Minna J. Kotkin, 
Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1439, 1491 (2009) (“The most common method is to show that similarly situated 
employees of a different race or sex received more favorable treatment.”). 
 120. For a discussion of the problems created by the widespread judicial re-
liance on similarly situated comparators in employment discrimination law gen-
erally, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 
728 (2011). For a discussion of the problems specific to pregnancy cases, see 
Widiss, supra note 23, at 1016 (“Theoretically, a plaintiff should be able to pre-
sent other kinds of evidence that would suggest bias, such as evidence that a 
decision-maker believed pregnant employees were generally incompetent or un-
reliable, and some courts have held that discrimination claims can succeed even 
in the absence of comparators. As a practical matter, however, courts often re-
quire comparators and will dismiss a case or grant summary judgment if a 
plaintiff lacks them.”). For an example of a court that required such a compar-
ator, to the plaintiff ’s detriment, in a pregnancy case, see Troupe v. May Dep’t 
Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738–39 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[the plaintiff ’s] 
failure to present any comparison evidence doomed her case”). 
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person with a similar job. Even within a larger employer, a dis-
crimination plaintiff may have a unique job title and, conse-
quently, lack a good comparator.121 
While problems such as finding a suitable comparator are 
not unique to pregnancy discrimination cases, the nature of 
pregnancy introduces additional complications. The appropriate 
comparator, according to the statutory language of the PDA, is a 
nonpregnant person whose capabilities at work are similar to the 
pregnant woman.122 Yet two problems stand in the way of using 
such a coworker as a comparator. As an initial matter, such a 
coworker may not exist; the pregnant woman may not have any 
nonpregnant coworkers who have ever faced similar health-re-
lated or physical restrictions but have been treated better by the 
employer.123 Moreover, even if such a coworker does exist, many 
courts have previously made a distinction between coworkers 
whose restrictions stem from on-the-job injury versus coworkers 
whose restrictions stem from off-the-job injury. 
In the past, federal courts often analogized pregnancy to an 
off-the-job injury (since the employer is not responsible for the 
pregnancy) and held that a coworker with an on-the-job injury 
cannot serve as a comparator—thus restricting a pregnant 
woman’s pool of potential comparators in a manner potentially 
fatal to her case.124 Consequently, when the Supreme Court dis-
 
 121. Franklin, supra note 97, at 1368 (“This requirement sharply curtails 
plaintiffs’ ability to prove they have been discriminated against ‘because of sex.’ 
People who work in small or sex-segregated workplaces or who are uniquely 
situated in their jobs will often be unable to produce comparators, meaning that 
they effectively reside outside the scope of Title VII’s protection.”). 
 122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 123. An appropriate comparator under the PDA must not be pregnant, must 
be similar in ability or inability to work, and must have been treated better by 
the employer. If the employer treats everyone with work restrictions poorly—
pregnant or not—it would not violate the PDA (unless a pregnant woman could 
otherwise prove discriminatory intent). See id.; Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (“The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not, despite the urgings of feminist schol-
ars, . . . require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make 
it easier for pregnant women to work.”). Note, however, that it might violate 
other antidiscrimination statutes, such as the ADA or the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA). 
 124. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 446–49 (4th 
Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, 
LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2011), abrogated by 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); 
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated 
by 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312–
13 (11th Cir. 1999), abrogated by 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); Urbano v. Cont’l Air-
lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by 135 S. Ct. 1338 
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credited this distinction between off-the-job and on-the-job inju-
ries in its 2015 case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,125 the 
Court enlarged the pool of potential comparators, which, in turn, 
should allow more pregnancy discrimination cases to move for-
ward successfully. In place of a strict place-of-injury distinction, 
the Court settled on a test in which an accommodation policy 
violates the PDA if it “impose[s] a significant burden on pregnant 
workers,” and “the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ 
reasons [for the policy] are not sufficiently strong to justify the 
burden.”126 How significant the burden on pregnant workers 
must be in order for a workplace accommodation policy to violate 
the PDA remains a subject for debate.127 Still, Young has ex-
panded the pool of potential comparators by allowing pregnant 
women, at least in some cases, to compare the employer’s more 
favorable treatment of another, nonpregnant worker whose un-
derlying injury occurred at work.128 Even with these recent ex-
pansions in the coverage of the PDA and ADA, however, widely 
 
(2015). Such cases have been widely criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Cox, supra 
note 108, at 470–71 (“[E]mployers’ post-ADAAA obligation to accommodate 
most nonpregnant employees with physical limitations will make it far more 
difficult for a PDA plaintiff to identify the type of comparator the Young court 
demands.”); Joanna Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: 
Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 41 (2009) (“The comparative right of accommodation under 
the PDA is already minimal; permitting employers to undermine it . . . contra-
venes Congress’ clear intent to focus on the actual effects of pregnancy on work-
ing capacity when defining discrimination.”); Grossman, supra note 23, at 615 
(“These cases, in my view, are wrongly decided, in part because they ignore the 
PDA’s mandate that pregnant women be treated as well as others ‘similar in 
their ability or inability to work’; the PDA does not delegate to employers the 
right to select any neutral comparison group for the purpose of granting work-
place accommodations. It specifically directs them to focus on capacity alone. 
Yet, courts have been surprisingly tacit in evaluating these policies.”); Widiss, 
supra note 23, at 963–64 (“The problem stems from determining who ‘counts’ as 
a comparator for PDA analysis. Several circuits have held that employees who 
receive light duty assignments after workplace injuries cannot be used as com-
parators for PDA analysis. More recently, a handful of courts have suggested 
that employees accommodated pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(‘ADA’) are also not appropriate comparators for PDA analysis.”).  
 125. 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353–55 (2015). 
 126. Id. at 1354. 
 127. See Deborah A. Widiss, The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act After Young v. UPS, 50 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1423, 1438 (2017) (“But, once an employer has provided an accommoda-
tion to at least some other employees, it is clear that the cost is not inherently 
prohibitive, and evidence that the employer routinely provides such benefits to 
many employees makes this all the more apparent.”). 
 128. Note that Young makes clear that nonpregnant workers injured on the 
job will not always serve as appropriate comparators for pregnant women, for 
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supported proposals exist for even further expansions, as re-
viewed in the next Section. 
C. PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL EXPANSIONS IN PROTECTIONS 
Among pregnancy advocates and scholars, reactions to the 
ADAAA and Young decision have been generally positive, albeit 
cautious. Given that less than a decade ago, remarkably few 
pregnant women could expect to gain relief under either the ADA 
or the PDA—whether due to dismissive characterizations of 
their condition as temporary and normal or due to the lack of 
relevant comparators within their workplace—recent case law 
reveals a shift in judicial attitudes towards pregnant workers’ 
rights.129 Nonetheless, while recognizing the developments of 
the last decade as key steps in pregnant women becoming “a full 
and integrated part of the workforce,”130 these same advocates 
and scholars universally agree that pregnant women have yet to 
arrive at full integration into the workforce.131 
 
to do so would grant pregnant women “‘most-favored-nation status,’ such that 
employers who provide one or two workers with an accommodation must pro-
vide similar accommodations to all pregnant workers, irrespective of any other 
criteria.” Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1342. Thus, even in the post-Young regime, preg-
nant women, through no fault of their own, may be unable to produce a compar-
ator satisfactory to a court. 
 129. See Widiss, supra note 127, at 1424 (“The legal landscape has changed 
dramatically.”); see also Areheart, supra note 64, at 1138 (“Here, Young departs 
dramatically from previous case law in that having a pregnancy-blind accom-
modation policy is no longer an absolute defense against a disparate treatment 
claim.”); Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: 
From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 
GEO. L.J. 559, 560–61 (2017) (arguing that Young broadened the class of em-
ployees to which pregnant women may be compared, thus expanding the avail-
ability of PDA claims); Joanna L. Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy 
Discrimination Law as It Approaches Full Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 860 
(2016) (“Young was an important ruling, breaking up a disturbing pattern in 
which courts were refusing to give the PDA its intended scope. It set the stage 
for courts to look more closely at denials of accommodation, and the early evi-
dence suggests that they are doing just that. But it didn’t, and couldn’t, extend 
the scope of the PDA, which is the obvious next step.”); Williams et al., supra 
note 108, at 101 (“These cases suggest that, despite an initial period of confu-
sion, courts have begun to recognize that the ADA now offers accommodations 
for many pregnant women.”). 
 130. Grossman, supra note 129, at 866. 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 860 (“Young was an important ruling, breaking up a dis-
turbing pattern in which courts were refusing to give the PDA its intended 
scope. It set the stage for courts to look more closely at denials of accommoda-
tion, and the early evidence suggests that they are doing just that. But it didn’t, 
and couldn’t, extend the scope of the PDA, which is the obvious next step.”); see 
also Danielle Boyd, Unmasking the Flaws in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act: 
The Fight for Equal Treatment for Pregnant Workers, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 53, 
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The particular impediment to pregnant, working women 
most often identified by scholars is that, even in the post-
ADAAA, post-Young regime, these women are not guaranteed 
the right to reasonable accommodation in the workplace.132 At 
best, the post-Amendments’ understanding of the ADA man-
dates reasonable accommodation solely for women who are sub-
stantially limited by their pregnancies, not for all pregnant 
women.133 Similarly, the post-Young understanding of the PDA 
contemplates reasonable accommodation for pregnant workers 
only to the extent that such accommodations are provided for 
nonpregnant workers.134 The straightforward solution to this al-
leged, remaining impediment for pregnant women in the work-
place—and the solution arrived at by most pregnancy scholars—
is to pass new legislation. 
 
53 (2015) (“In the workforce today, pregnant employees still encounter discrim-
ination, gender bias, and other barriers to equal employment opportunities.”); 
Thelma L. Harmon, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: The Equal Treatment 
Fallacy, 20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 99 (2017) (“[W]omen of childbearing 
years have remained disadvantaged in the face of ostensibly fair and neutral 
laws and policies.”); Stephanie A. Pisko, Towards Reasonable: The Rise of State 
Pregnancy Accommodation Laws, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 152 (2016) 
(“Although Young is a positive step and might provide great benefits to pregnant 
workers whose employers provide accommodation to other workers, its holding 
is limited.”); Sarah Czypinski, Note, Pregnant Laborers Should Expect Better: 
The Broken Pregnancy Discrimination Standard and How the Pregnant Work-
ers Fairness Act Can Repair It, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 303, 323 (2014) (“Pregnant 
employees have little recourse for discrimination in the workplace.”). 
 132. See Areheart, supra note 64, at 1138 (“However, the holding is still a 
far cry from what Young and most amici sought: a guaranteed right to preg-
nancy accommodations.”). 
 133. See id. at 1134 (“For example, pregnancy may cause discrete physiolog-
ical conditions such as gestational diabetes or carpal tunnel syndrome, which 
may constitute a disability under the ADA, entitling a pregnant worker to rea-
sonable accommodations. But limitations intrinsically associated with a typical 
pregnancy, such as the need for more rest or more frequent bathroom breaks, 
would not generally entitle one to accommodations under the ADA.”). 
 134. Famously, Judge Posner once wrote that under the PDA, “[e]mployers 
can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpreg-
nant employees.” Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 
1994). See also Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 995, 1113 (2015) (“[A]s in other areas of Title VII law, the PDA does 
not require employers to create jobs or employment benefits, but only to distrib-
ute existing ones equally.”). 
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With little exception,135 scholars have enthusiastically en-
dorsed the PWFA,136 a bill introduced in both houses of the 114th 
and 115th Congresses, which would “prohibit[] employment 
practices that discriminate against making reasonable accom-
modations for job applicants or employees affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”137 Modeled on the 
framework of disability law, the PWFA explicitly extends the 
guarantees of the ADA to all pregnant women.138 This bill, which 
is also widely supported by multiple women’s organizations,139 
 
 135. Bradley Areheart and Vicki Schultz stand out as the lone prior scholars 
to call into question the approach of the PWFA. While not the sole focus of her 
2015 article on the successes and failures of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for 
women, Schultz considered the issues that pregnancy continued to impose for 
women in the workplace. Instead of championing the PWFA like everyone else, 
she expressed concern regarding any proposed legislation that would single out 
pregnant women because “most pregnant women do not want special treat-
ment.” Schultz, supra note 134, at 1096. The following year, Bradley Areheart 
considered the otherwise widespread endorsement of the PWFA more thor-
oughly, raising concerns that the “expressive harms” resulting from the PWFA’s 
approach of singling out pregnant women for special treatment and of “equating 
pregnancy and disability” would ultimately cause more harm than good for 
pregnant women in the workplace. Areheart, supra note 64, at 1158–66. 
 136. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 129, at 860 (“If passed [the PWFA] 
would provide important protections . . . .”). Deborah Widiss has also endorsed 
the PWFA over the course of two articles, one pre-Young and one post-Young. 
See Widiss, supra note 23, at 1035; Widiss, supra note 127, at 1427. Note that 
numerous proposals exist to pass state-level pregnancy accommodation laws 
similar to the proposed PWFA; thus far, four states have successfully passed 
such legislation. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12s 
(West 2013 & Supp. 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11B-2 (West 2013 & Supp. 
2015). 
 137. Cong. Research Serv., Summary: H.R.2417 – Pregnant Workers Fair-
ness Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house 
-bill/2417 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 
2417, 115th Cong. (2017); Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 1101, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2654, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Preg-
nant Workers Fairness Act, S. 1512, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). The current ver-
sions of both the House and Senate bills remain in committee. 
 138. See H.R. 2417. 
 139. Supporting national organizations include A Better Balance, the Na-
tional Partnership for Women & Families, and the National Women’s Law Cen-
ter. See Pregnant Workers Fairness, A BETTER BALANCE, https://www.abetter 
balance.org/our-campaigns/pregnant-workers-fairness (last visited Oct. 30, 
2018); The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMILIES (May 2017), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/ 
workplace-fairness/pregnancy-discrimination/fact-sheet-pwfa.pdf; The Preg-
nant Workers Fairness Act: Making Room for Pregnancy on the Job, NAT’L 
WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (May 11, 2017), https://nwlc.org/resources/pregnant 
-workers-fairness-act-making-room-pregnancy-job. 
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has been praised by leading pregnancy scholars as a “clear di-
rective that employers provide reasonable support to their em-
ployees to make it possible to work safely and productively 
through a pregnancy,”140 as well as an “improve[ment] upon the 
PDA . . . rooted in substantive equality and a goal of ensuring 
that women who reproduce have the same opportunity to suc-
ceed at work as men who reproduce.”141  
On its face, advocating for the PWFA may seem appealing, 
as an intuitive way to increase protections for pregnant women 
in the workplace. Yet, such advocacy for the PWFA is arguably 
premature. Neither scholars nor women’s organizations have a 
good sense for whether pregnant women actually need additional 
protections in the workplace—due to lack of data, almost no mar-
ket-level evidence, empirical or otherwise, has existed to support 
passing additional laws.142 Even to the extent that litigation and 
anecdotal accounts indicate that pregnant women need addi-
tional legal protections, the absence of data has rendered advo-
cates unable to articulate how great the need is, or how the need 
has changed since the ADAAA and Young.143 Moreover, the lack 
 
 140. Widiss, supra note 127, at 1453; see also Widiss, supra note 23, at 1035 
(describing the PWFA as “an important step forward” for pregnancy-based dis-
crimination). 
 141. Grossman, supra note 129, at 860. 
 142. See infra Part III. 
 143. To the extent that empirical research on pregnancy (as distinct from 
motherhood) exists, it focuses on the labor supply response when maternity or 
motherhood-related policies change. For example, a 2015 article by a group of 
health economists found that expansions in Medicaid eligibility for pregnant 
women during the 1990s decreased labor supply of women who had given birth 
in the past year by more than ten percent. The article concluded that most of 
this reduction was due to pregnant women no longer having to work in order to 
maintain a benefit of particular importance to them: health insurance. See Dha-
val M. Dave et al., The Effect of Medicaid Expansions in the Late 1980s and 
Early 1990s on the Labor Supply of Pregnant Women, 1 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 
165, 167 (2015). On the other hand, a 2012 article found that the passage of the 
1978 PDA increased labor supply of pregnant women by more than eight per-
centage points because, according to the author, the Act removed perceived bar-
riers to remaining in a job both during and after pregnancy. Sankar Mukho-
padhyay, The Effects of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act on Female Labor 
Supply, 53 INT’L ECON. REV. 1133, 1133–36 (2012). Similarly, a more recent ar-
ticle reviewing prior studies on workplace maternity leave policies concluded 
that maternity leaves of less than one year after the birth of a child increase 
female workers’ long-term labor supply. Maya Rossin-Slater, Maternity and 
Family Leave Policy 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
23069, 2017). Still, pregnancy discrimination in the workplace—or the preg-
nancy penalty, as it is deemed here—is a labor demand issue. Pregnancy dis-
crimination, by definition, occurs when an employer takes an adverse employ-
ment action against a woman due to her pregnancy. 
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of market-level evidence also makes it impossible to answer 
questions regarding the relative prevalence of pregnancy dis-
crimination (as opposed to discrimination against other histori-
cally disadvantaged groups) and the heterogeneity of pregnancy 
discrimination (that is, whether the severity of pregnancy dis-
crimination may depend upon her disability status, socioeco-
nomic status, or other demographics). 
The inability to answer these basic questions undercuts 
scholars’ and advocates’ ability to make arguments regarding 
the necessity, the relative priority, and the required content of 
additional pregnancy legislation. In their defense, a paucity of 
data on labor-market outcomes of pregnant women has left them 
with very little evidence from which to draw, besides anecdotal 
evidence from recently litigated cases and popular media ac-
counts.144 In the next Part, I consider why this lack of labor-mar-
ket evidence on pregnant women has persisted for so long; I then 
introduce the one data source that can begin to shed light on 
these fundamental, yet unanswered, questions about pregnancy 
discrimination from a system-wide perspective. Such data are 
critical to inform debates regarding both the need for and the 
composition of novel pregnancy legislation. 
III.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE 
PREGNANCY PENALTY   
The lack of empirical studies on discrimination against preg-
nant women in the workplace is surprising at first but, at bot-
tom, largely results from insufficient data. To illustrate the dif-
ficulty with obtaining relevant data on pregnant women, 
consider what is necessary for the study presented in this Arti-
cle. At minimum, a study like the present one requires data that 
both identify pregnant women and contain enough pregnant 
women in the sample to make statistical inferences regarding 
them. Quantifying labor market disparities for pregnant women 
further requires at least some information on labor market sta-
tus. Moreover, to investigate the motivations behind the preg-
nancy penalty, additional data relevant to the different aspects 
 
 144. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC 
Sues Siskind Group for Pregnancy Discrimination (July 10, 2017), https://www 
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-10-17.cfm (discussing an EEOC lawsuit 
against an apparel company for pregnancy discrimination); see also Patrick Dor-
rian, Bob Evans Discriminated Against Pregnant Server, Judge Rules, BLOOM-
BERG (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/bob-evans-discriminated 
-n73014463369 (discussing the EEOC’s victory in a pregnancy discrimination 
suit against a restaurant). 
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of pregnancy—particularly data that could provide insight into 
pregnancy’s ability to disable, alter appearances, and increase 
caretaking responsibilities—would be useful. Finally, to sepa-
rate out the effects of pregnancy from other potentially corre-
lated effects, data that report at least some relevant de-
mographics and educational background would be ideal. 
Although none of the major observational datasets focused 
on the labor market meet these demanding requirements,145 one 
health-focused dataset emerges as a suitable candidate. The 
BRFSS is an annual telephone survey compiled by the CDC to 
assess Americans’ health since 1984.146 Today, more than 
400,000 people eighteen years of age or older respond to the 
BRFSS each year.147 Because the BRFSS’s focus is health status 
 
 145. U.S. Census long-form data and American Community Survey data, 
which could theoretically provide huge samples of pregnant women, do not iden-
tify pregnant women. See, e.g., Am. Fact Finder, Profile of General Population 
and Housing Characteristics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder 
.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2018). The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is 
another large observational dataset run by the U.S. Census Bureau that does 
identify respondents who are pregnant and their labor market characteristics. 
The SIPP, however, fails to provide other characteristics relevant to the preg-
nancy penalty, such as pregnancy’s effect on appearance. See U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, 2014 SIPP PRODUCTION: SIPP PUBLIC USE METADATA REPORT 2164–
70 (2017), http://www.nber.org/sipp/2014/2014SIPP_Metadata_AllSections.pdf 
(showing that pregnancy was offered as a response for some questions, but only 
in relation to why the respondent had to take unpaid leave from work). The U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Current Population Survey identifies preg-
nancy, labor market status, demographic and educational characteristics, and 
appearance details (in the form of weight and height data) for a small subsample 
of respondents who have taken a follow-up survey called the Eating and Health 
Module. But there is just six years’ worth of data in the Module and it contains 
only about thirty pregnant women per year, making it difficult to identify effects 
of both pregnancy and its related short- and long-term effects in a statistically 
meaningful way. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey 
(ATUS) Eating & Health Module Microdata Files, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www 
.bls.gov/tus/ehdatafiles.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2017) (providing the available 
datasets for each of the six years); Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time 
Use Survey: Eating & Health Module 2014–16 Questionnaire, U.S. DEP’T LAB. 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/tus/ehmquestionnaire1416.pdf (factoring preg-
nancy into a respondent’s weight). The BLS’s National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth is similarly limited by sample size problems. See NLS INVESTIGATOR, 
https://www.nlsinfo.org/investigator/pages/search.jsp?s=NLSY97 (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2018) (providing the datasets from both the 1979 and 1997 cohorts).  
 146. About the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), CEN-
TERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/about/ 
about_brfss.htm (last updated July 31, 2014). 
 147. See 2017 BRFSS Annual Survey Data and Documentation, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/annual_data/ 
annual_2017.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2018). 
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and health behaviors, the BRFSS has been widely used by schol-
ars focusing on health outcomes; it has been used more sparsely, 
however, by scholars focusing on employment outcomes, which 
may explain why it has not yet been used to study pregnancy in 
the labor market.148  
While the majority of questions focus on health conditions, 
the BRFSS additionally asks respondents about labor market 
status, household income, disability status, health conditions, 
weight, height, education, and demographic background.149 As 
the BRFSS is the only observational dataset well suited to the 
present study, this Article will take advantage of its long time 
span, relying on the last quarter-century of BRFSS data, from 
1993 (the year Title I of the ADA went into effect) to 2016 (the 
last year of available data), whenever possible. Note, however, 
that because the availability of some questions may vary from 
year to year within the BRFSS, a few analyses will necessarily 
be limited to a shorter time span. For the most part, however, 
this time period allows for comparisons pre- and post-ADAAA as 
well as pre- and post-Young.150 
Using these data, the analysis will focus on the employment 
status of labor market participants.151 Because this analysis 
 
 148. In fact, the labor market studies that have previously used the BRFSS 
have examined the effects of health status on labor market outcomes, much like 
the present paper. See, e.g., Christopher S. Carpenter, The Effects of Employ-
ment Protection for Obese People, 45 INDUS. REL. 393 (2006) (examining the im-
pact of disability discrimination laws and litigation on the labor market out-
comes of obese individuals); Shinall, supra note 103, at 11–20. 
 149. See 2018 BRFSS Questionnaire, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/questionnaires/pdf 
-ques/2018_BRFSS_English_Questionnaire.pdf. Even though supervised and 
compiled by the CDC at the national level, the BRFSS is actually administered 
on the ground at the state level. Consequently, some variation exists in the op-
tional questions that states choose to ask respondents; nonetheless, every state 
asks the above questions. See, e.g., 2017 Modules by State by Data Set & Weight, 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/ 
questionnaires/modules/state2017.htm (last updated Sept. 4, 2018) (listing the 
BRFSS module used by each state). 
 150. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 151. The BRFSS does not report individual earnings—instead reporting only 
household income in ranges—which is why this analysis focuses on employment 
of labor market participants. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 2015 CODEBOOK REPORT 
(2016), https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/annual_data/2015/pdf/codebook15_llcp.pdf. 
Because the analysis seeks to gain insight into pregnancy discrimination in em-
ployment (a labor demand issue), it focuses on pregnant women whose labor 
supply decisions have remained the same, or at least similar to, their prepreg-
nancy decisions by eliminating women who have exited the labor market (and 
have chosen to significantly alter their labor supply) from the sample. 
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seeks to gain insight into pregnancy discrimination (a labor de-
mand issue), the analysis eliminates women who have exited the 
labor market (and have chosen to significantly alter their labor 
supply) from the sample.152 Consequently, for the analysis pre-
sented in the next two Parts, I define both labor market partici-
pation and employment to match as closely as possible to the 
definitions used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).153 I de-
fine labor market participants as respondents who are employed 
for wages, self-employed, or out of work as participating in the 
labor market.154 I define homemakers, students, and individuals 
who are retired or unable to work as non-labor market partici-
pants.155 Among labor market participants, I count respondents 
who are employed for wages or self-employed as employed, and 
I count respondents who are out of work as unemployed. Because 
the majority of this analysis focuses on employment of labor mar-
ket participants, I concentrate on respondents who are employed 
or looking for work; non-labor market participants (i.e. self-iden-
tified homemakers, students, retirees, and individuals unable to 
work) are dropped from the sample. Sharpening the focus to re-
spondents who are in the labor market (as opposed to all re-
spondents) eliminates respondents who cannot work and who 
voluntarily choose not to work. This focus, in turn, eliminates at 
least some confounding labor supply issues—issues which are 
particularly salient when studying women who are about to have 
children.156  
 
 152. The role of pregnant women’s labor supply will be further explored, 
however. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 153. Technically, the BLS defines employed as doing any work for pay or 
profit during a given week and defines unemployed as not having a job but ac-
tively looking for one during the past four weeks. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
How the Government Measures Unemployment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:// 
www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm (last updated Oct. 8, 2015). 
 154. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 151, at 25 
(coding whether respondents are employed for wages, self-employed, out of 
work, homemakers, students, retired, or unable to work). 
 155. See id. 
 156. Note that labor market participation is not a perfect measure of labor 
supply since a woman may pull herself out of the labor market as a result of low 
labor market demand for her services. Along these lines, a woman may become 
a homemaker or a student temporarily while she looks for work. Nonetheless, if 
we assume any reduction in pregnant women’s labor market participation is 
solely the result of their own voluntary choices to reduce their labor supply (and 
has nothing to do with reduced employer demand for their services), the esti-
mates can then be viewed as an upper bound on the number of women who 
voluntarily choose to leave the labor market as a result of childbearing. 
  
2018] THE PREGNANCY PENALTY 785 
 
The primary focus of the analysis will be comparing the em-
ployment outcomes of 53,031 pregnant adult women, ages eight-
een to forty-four, to the outcomes of 1,272,995 nonpregnant adult 
women of childbearing age (defined in the BRFSS as women ages 
eighteen to forty-four).157 The analysis will further take ad-
vantage of the additional information on respondents contained 
within the BRFSS; to the extent that pregnant and nonpregnant 
women are systematically different from each other in ways be-
yond expecting a child, these differences should be accounted for 
and held constant. Examples of such relevant information, which 
will serve as control variables in this study, include year of sur-
vey, age,158 educational attainment, race, ethnicity, and marital 
status. Moreover, because some states have more robust legal 
regimes for protecting pregnant women,159 these differences will 
be accounted for through state-level control variables.160  
Finally, the analysis will utilize the rich health-related data 
contained within the BRFSS, which can provide insight into the 
role of the short- and long-term components of the pregnancy 
penalty. For example, the BRFSS reports whether respondents 
have activity limitations161 and/or require accommodating 
equipment.162 Both indicators can increase the understanding of 
 
 157. The BRFSS only asks women within this age range about their preg-
nancy status. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 
151, at 27.  
 158. Regression analyses all include a control for age as well as an age-
squared term. 
 159. For a map documenting state-by-state availability of pregnancy dis-
crimination/support laws, see State by State Map – Pregnancy Discrimination 
Laws, Breastfeeding and Leave Rights, LEGAL MOMENTUM, https://www 
.legalmomentum.org/state-state-map-pregnancy-discrimination-laws 
-breastfeeding-and-leave-rights (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). Adding state fixed 
effects into a regression means adding indicator variables for each state (minus 
one to prevent multicollinearity). These indicator variables will be equal to one 
for a respondent’s state of residence, and otherwise equal to zero. Note also that 
time fixed effects (i.e. indicator variables equal to one for the year the respond-
ent is observed) are also included in every regression presented here. 
 160. These controls, commonly known as state fixed effects, are indicator 
variables equal to one when a resident lives in that state. 
 161. Respondents were asked if they are “limited in any way in any activities 
because of physical, mental, or emotional problems.” See CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 151, at 28. 
 162. Respondents were classified as needing accommodation if they reported 
having “any health problem that require[d] [them] to use special equipment, 
such as a cane, a wheelchair, a special bed, or a special telephone,” even if that 
use is only “occasional” or “in certain circumstances.” See id. 
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the comparative disability statuses163 of pregnant and nonpreg-
nant women, as well as the understanding of disability’s relative 
effects on the employment outcomes of these two populations. 
The BRFSS also reports respondents’ current weight and 
height,164 which can provide insight into the appearance-altering 
effects of pregnancy. To address the care-increasing aspects of 
pregnancy, the analysis will take advantage of BRFSS data re-
porting whether respondents already have minor children.165 
These data will allow for additional comparisons of pregnant 
women having their first child (for whom caretaking responsibil-
ities may increase most dramatically after childbirth) to preg-
nant women who already have other children, to nonpregnant 
women who have children, and to nonpregnant women without 
children. 
In the following Part, the empirical analysis first compares 
the employment of women, by childbearing status, graphically 
over time. The graphs and analyses document the persistent, 
raw gaps in employment between pregnant and nonpregnant 
women over the last quarter-century. The next Part further re-
lays the regression-adjusted estimates of these gaps, which take 
into account how the average pregnant woman differs from the 
average nonpregnant woman in other ways that may matter for 
employment outcomes, such as in demographics and educa-
tion.166 A regression analysis allows empirical researchers to ex-
amine the mean outcome for a group of interest, holding all other 
sources of potential variation constant.167 The regression-aggres-
sion results tell much the same story as do the graphical results 
 
 163. Throughout the analysis, a respondent is defined as disabled if she re-
ports having an activity limitation and/or needing accommodating equipment. 
 164. Id. at 27. 
 165. Id. at 25. 
 166. As seen in Appendix Table 2, column one of the regression analysis just 
controls for pregnancy status, race, ethnicity, age (and age-squared), marital 
status, and the presence of children. Column two additionally controls for BMI 
classification (overweight, obese, and morbidly obese) and interactions of these 
classifications with pregnancy as well as disability status and interaction of dis-
ability status with pregnancy. Column three further controls for the interaction 
of education level with pregnancy. 
 167. More formally, the regression model used to gain insight into the com-
ponents of the pregnancy penalty is 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛾1 + 𝑃𝑡𝛾2 + (𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑡)𝛾3 + 𝑆𝜎1 + 𝑇𝑡𝜎2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , 
where Y is the outcome variable of interest, X is a vector of individual charac-
teristics (including age, age squared, race, ethnicity, highest level of education, 
marital status, and presence of a child), P is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the respondent is pregnant, Z is a vector of components that may contribute 
to pregnancy’s labor market effects (including BMI classification and disability), 
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regarding the pregnancy penalty: The penalty is large and en-
during, especially when compared to other well-documented pen-
alties against historically disadvantaged groups in the labor 
market. 
IV.  QUANTIFYING THE PREGNANCY PENALTY   
This Part takes an initial step towards answering the many 
questions that remain about systematic pregnancy discrimina-
tion in the labor market. Understanding the how much, how of-
ten, when, and why of pregnancy discrimination is an essential 
prerequisite to making policy arguments regarding the inade-
quacy of current legislation and the necessity of future legisla-
tion, for without answers to these basic questions, such argu-
ments remain threadbare. Part IV.A begins by documenting and 
contextualizing the magnitude of gaps in employment that exist 
for pregnant women. Part IV.A also considers whether these per-
sistent gaps in employment of pregnant women are driven by 
employers through labor demand, or pregnant women them-
selves through labor supply. Part IV.B tackles the question of 
why the pregnancy penalty exists, examining the role of both the 
short- and long-term effects of pregnancy. 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE PREGNANCY PENALTY 
1. The Persistence of the Pregnancy Penalty 
Using the 1993 to 2016 BRFSS data, Figure 1 graphs the 
employment rate of nonpregnant female labor-market partici-
pants, ages eighteen to forty-four (circle line), against the em-
ployment rate of pregnant labor-market participants within the 
same age range (triangle line). As the graph makes clear, the 
employment rates of pregnant women have remained substan-
tially below the employment rates of nonpregnant women during 
the past quarter-century. Nor does this employment gap appear 
to have closed much over time. In fact, the gap in employment 
rates of pregnant women seems to have remained just as robust 
after the passage of the 2008 Amendments to the ADA as before 
 
P*Z is an interaction term (which will be statistically different from zero if the 
effects of BMI classification and disability are different for pregnant women 
than for nonpregnant women), S are state fixed effects, and T are year fixed 
effects. All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model since the 
outcome variables of interest are binary—equal to one if in the labor market 
(employed), and equal to zero if not in the labor market (unemployed). 
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the Amendments.168 Some visual evidence does exist to suggest 
that employment outcomes for pregnant women may have im-
proved somewhat in the single year of data available following 
the 2015 Young169 decision; time will reveal whether this im-
provement is lasting.170 
 
Figure 1. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of Nonpregnant 
and Pregnant Women, Ages 18–44, in the Labor Market 
 
When averaged over the twenty-four-year time period, the 
raw gap in employment rates of pregnant women is 5.0 percent-
age points; that is, pregnant women participating in the labor 
market were 5.0 percentage points less likely to be employed 
than were nonpregnant women in the labor market between 
1993 and 2016.171 The regression-adjusted gap in pregnant and 
 
 168. See also Appendix Table 5 (confirming through regression analysis that 
pregnant women’s employment outcomes did not meaningfully improve after 
the ADAAA). 
 169. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 170. Appendix Table 6, which uses regression analysis to compare employ-
ment outcomes of pregnant women before and after Young, does not find a sta-
tistically significant improvement in employment rates when comparing the 
eighteen months immediately before the decision to the eighteen months imme-
diately after the decision. This statistical insignificance may be an artifact of 
lack of data, given the recency of the Young decision. More years of data are 
necessary to evaluate fully the impact of Young. 
 171. The raw employment-gap summary statistics numbers are provided in 
Appendix Table 1. 
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nonpregnant women’s employment rates—which, as described 
in Part III, takes into account other differences in demographics 
and education172—is slightly smaller, at 4.2 percentage points.173 
In sum, even though scholars and advocates may have been gen-
erally optimistic about the pregnancy-related legal develop-
ments over the past decade,174 the labor-market data lends far 
fewer reasons to be optimistic in terms of systematic outcomes. 
2. The Depth of the Pregnancy Penalty 
The persistence of a gap in employment rates for pregnant 
women for more than two decades, in spite of supposed expan-
sions in legal protections,175 may alone be a source for concern. 
But what does a 4.2 percentage point gap in employment for 
pregnant women mean in context? In an environment of limited 
resources, especially when it comes to civil rights protections, it 
is difficult to discern from Figure 1 alone how relatively large the 
pregnancy employment gap is when compared to other well-doc-
umented employment gaps for historically disadvantaged 
groups.176 Figures 2 and 3 are useful to place the pregnancy gap 
in context and clarify its significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 172. For a detailed description of regression control variables, see supra note 
166. 
 173. This estimate is derived from the coefficient on pregnancy in column 
two of Appendix Table 2. 
 174. See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 175. See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 176. The economics literature on the persistent and robust wage and em-
ployment gaps faced by historically disadvantaged groups is broad. See, e.g., 
Dan Black et al., Why Do Minority Men Earn Less? A Study of Wage Differentials 
Among the Highly Educated, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 300 (2006) (finding that 
only about one-quarter of the wage gap between highly educated white men and 
highly educated black men is explained by premarket factors); Joni Hersch, Pro-
filing the New Immigrant Worker: The Effects of Skin Color and Height, 26 J. 
LAB. ECON. 345 (2008) (finding that skin color and height affect wages among 
new lawful immigrants to the United States); Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ih-
lanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes for Minority 
Workers, 113 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1998) (finding that the racial composition of an 
establishment’s customers impacts the race of who gets hired and the relative 
wages of employees by race). 
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Figure 2. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of White Women, 
Black Women, and Pregnant Women, Ages 18–44, in the Labor 
Market 
 
Figure 2 plots the employment rate of white female labor-
market participants, ages eighteen to forty-four (circle line), 
against the employment rate of pregnant labor-market partici-
pants within the same age range (triangle line).177  
Figure 2 additionally plots the employment rate of black fe-
male labor-market participants, ages eighteen to forty-four (plus 
line). Figure 2 is intended to compare the magnitude of the well-
known black-white employment gap to the less-understood preg-
nancy gap. The visual evidence from Figure 2 is striking—preg-
nant women in the labor market do about as poorly, in terms of 
finding and maintaining employment, as black women in the la-
bor market. This visual observation holds in both the estimates 
of the raw and of the regression-adjusted average employment 
gaps for pregnant women between 1993 and 2016. Although 
black women’s employment rate remained slightly lower than 
pregnant women’s employment rate over this time period, the 
raw employment gap between pregnant women and black 
 
 177. Note that the calculated white and black employment rates in Figure 2 
are calculated for all women, regardless of their pregnancy status. If instead 
these race-based employment rates were calculated using only the nonpregnant 
women in the sample, the circle and plus lines would shift upwards, leaving the 
triangle pregnancy line clearly below. Thus, Figure 2 if anything understates 
the relative disadvantage of pregnant women in employment. 
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women is just 0.7 percentage points; the adjusted employment 
rate gap is merely 0.2 percentage points.178 
 
Figure 3. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of White Women, 
Hispanic Women, and Pregnant Women, Ages 18–44, in the La-
bor Market 
 
Figure 3 is very similar to Figure 2, except in Figure 3, the 
plus line designates employment rate of Hispanic female labor-
market participants, ages eighteen to forty-four.179 The visual 
evidence from Figure 3 suggests that pregnant women in the la-
bor market may do slightly better, in terms of finding and main-
taining employment, as Hispanic women in the labor market. 
Here, this visual observation holds only in the estimate of the 
raw average employment gap. Even though the raw average em-
ployment gap of 0.3 percentage points between pregnant women 
and Hispanic women suggests that Hispanic women have 
slightly worse outcomes, the adjusted employment rate gap 
yields the opposite conclusion. According to the regression-ad-
justed estimate of the gap, pregnant women in the labor market 
 
 178. See column two of Appendix Table 2. 
 179. As in Figure 2, the employment rates of white women and Hispanic 
women are calculated using all women in the sample, regardless of pregnancy 
status. This choice arguably understates the depth of the pregnancy penalty. 
See supra note 177. 
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have a 3.1 percentage point lower employment rate than His-
panic women’s employment rate in the labor market.180 
Taken together, the data presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3 
indicate that pregnant women in the labor market fare both ab-
solutely and relatively poorly. Over the last twenty-four years, 
their employment rates have remained consistently below aver-
age, at rates similar to those of minority women. These findings 
alone may suggest that pregnant women should be a relative pri-
ority for advocates of increased civil rights’ protections. Still, 
pregnancy is different than race or ethnicity—not only is preg-
nancy more voluntary and mutable,181 but also it may send a sig-
nal about future labor supply, which is considered in the next 
Section. 
3. Assessing the Role of Labor Supply 
Before further exploring the BRFSS data, it is important to 
step back and consider whether the pregnancy gap documented 
in the prior two Sections is equivalent to pregnancy discrimina-
tion. In other words, is the 4.2 percentage point lower employ-
ment rate for pregnant women, discussed in Part IV.A.1, entirely 
due to employer discrimination against pregnant women? Or is 
it due to something else? The principal concern is that, instead 
of the employment gap for pregnant women being driven by em-
ployers’ preference against employing pregnant women (i.e. la-
bor demand), the gap may instead be driven by pregnant 
women’s own preferences (i.e. labor supply). As previously dis-
cussed in Part I.B, both the novel caretaking demands and per-
sonal values associated with motherhood may leave a new 
mother unwilling to be employed.  
Although limitations in the BRFSS data render it impossi-
ble to parse out precisely how much of the employment gap is 
due to pregnant women’s labor supply, two significant clues sug-
gest that the gap is not principally due to labor supply. First, 
 
 180. See column two of Appendix Table 2. The regression-adjusted gap can 
change in magnitude or direction from the raw gap whenever the two groups 
being compared differ in other respects. Here, it might be the case that the dif-
ferences in the raw and adjusted gaps seen between pregnant women and His-
panic women may be driven by differences in average age or education between 
these two groups of women. 
 181. Although voluntariness and mutability were once the hallmarks of de-
fining a protected class under civil rights law, recent extensions in civil rights 
law to protect individuals on the basis of disability, sexual orientation, credit 
history, and criminal history have been increasingly in tension with these con-
cepts. See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L. J. 2 
(2015) (putting forth a critique of continued reliance on the mutability doctrine). 
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recall that the employment rates presented in this Article are 
the employment rates of labor market participants. Thus, any 
woman who has completely removed herself from the labor mar-
ket, identifying instead as a homemaker, student, retired, or un-
able to work, is excluded from the data analysis presented 
throughout this text. By excluding women from the analysis who 
are not looking for employment, the employment gap presented 
in the prior two Sections cannot be blamed on women who vol-
untarily and completely choose to stop working.182 
As a second test of the effect of pregnancy on the labor sup-
ply of pregnant women, I examine the effect of pregnancy on a 
woman’s presence in the labor market. Although the raw gap in 
labor market participation rates of nonpregnant and pregnant 
women is 6.0 percentage points,183 the regression-adjusted gap 
in participation rates is not statistically different from zero.184 In 
other words, pregnant women are just as likely to participate in 
the labor market as are their nonpregnant peers, once all other 
differences between these two groups are taken into account. 
While this finding cannot completely rule out the hypothesis that 
the pregnancy employment gap is due in part to other changes 
in labor supply (for instance, willingness to work certain hours 
or in certain locations), it does strongly suggest that the preg-
nancy employment gap documented in the prior two Sections is 
not entirely a labor supply story. Instead, this finding suggests 
that the source of the gap is at least somewhat driven by the 
labor demand side—through the mechanism of employer dis-
crimination. 
B. THE COMPONENTS OF THE PREGNANCY PENALTY 
If employer discrimination is at least partially to blame for 
the low employment rates of pregnant women, then the question 
of why employers continue to discriminate against pregnant 
women—in the presence of two relevant, federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws—naturally follows. The following three Sections con-
sider the potential drivers of the pregnancy penalty, both long-
term and short-term. To the extent that pregnancy signals a 
 
 182. Admittedly, one of the limitations in the BRFSS data with respect to 
labor supply is the inability to discern the length of time worked (e.g., from full-
time to part-time) since willingness to work longer hours may change with preg-
nancy and motherhood. Thus, the BRFSS is less helpful with respect to women 
who may reduce, but not completely eliminate, their labor supply because of 
pregnancy. 
 183. See Appendix Table 1. 
 184. See column three of Appendix Table 3. 
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long-term change in caretaking responsibilities or triggers em-
ployers’ value judgments regarding motherhood, the pregnancy 
penalty may be an extension of the previously discussed mother-
hood penalty.185 The relationship between the pregnancy and 
motherhood penalties are considered in Part IV.B.1. On the 
other hand, Part IV.B.2 and Part IV.B.3 explore the role of short-
term changes that accompany the nine months of pregnancy in 
the form of appearance changes and disability. Understanding 
both the long- and short-term drivers of the pregnancy penalty 
is essential before making any future recommendations regard-
ing pregnancy policy. 
1. Pregnancy and Motherhood 
As discussed in Part I.B, empirical scholars have long docu-
mented a wage and employment penalty for being a mother in 
the labor market. The penalty is robust and persistent, even af-
ter other observable differences between mothers and nonmoth-
ers are taken into account. Indeed, studies on mothers using 
more extensive data than the BRFSS—which can take into ac-
count not only differences in demographics, marital status, and 
education, but also differences in the hours worked, years of ex-
perience, occupations, and industries of mothers versus 
nonmothers—still find evidence of a motherhood penalty in both 
wages186 and employment.187 
In light of the motherhood penalty, it is natural to question 
its relationship to the pregnancy penalty. If employers penalize 
existing mothers, they may also penalize expectant mothers. To 
the extent that the pregnancy penalty is related to the mother-
hood penalty, the relationship must be clarified. The pregnancy 
penalty may be fully coextensive with the motherhood penalty; 
it may instead be smaller or larger. Indeed, the pregnancy pen-
alty could be partially or wholly the result of employers’ antici-
pating the long-term changes that come with a female em-
ployee’s motherhood in terms of caretaking and status. 
Clarifying the relationship between the motherhood and preg-
 
 185. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 186. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 81, at 282 (finding a three to five 
percent wage penalty for mothers); Michelle Budig & Paula England, The Wage 
Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 204, 213 (2001) (finding a five to seven 
percent wage penalty per child for mothers). 
 187. See, e.g., Correll et al., supra note 76, at 1330 (finding that employers 
were less likely to call a mother back through an experimental audit study). 
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nancy penalties is essential to clarifying the appropriate reme-
dial policy. To the extent that the pregnancy penalty is the same 
as the motherhood penalty, then any legal policy meant to reduce 
the motherhood penalty—for example, a policy that encourages 
employers to keep mothers on their payroll, such as government-
subsidized paid family leave188—should also reduce the preg-
nancy penalty. To the extent that the pregnancy penalty differs 
from the motherhood penalty, however, then such mother-di-
rected policies will fail to fully close the employment gap be-
tween pregnant and nonpregnant women. 
To examine the relationship between the motherhood and 
pregnancy penalties, Figure 4 graphs the employment rates of 
nonpregnant nonmothers (circle line), nonpregnant mothers of 
minor children (plus line),189 and pregnant women (triangle line) 
in the years between 1993 and 2016, inclusive. The difference 
between the circle line and the plus line is the motherhood pen-
alty, and the difference between the circle line and the triangle 
line is the pregnancy penalty. As Figure 4 makes clear, the tri-
angle line consistently falls below the plus line, indicating that 
the pregnancy penalty has remained consistently greater than 
the motherhood penalty. Employment rates of pregnant women 
fell consistently below employment rates of mothers throughout 
this twenty-four-year time period. Between 1993 and 2016, the 
raw estimated gap in employment rates between pregnant 
women and nonpregnant mothers is 4.1 percentage points; the 
regression-adjusted gap is 1.6 percentage points.190 The adjusted 
estimates further indicate that employment outcomes are espe-
cially poor for pregnant women who are already mothers. Preg-
nant women having their first child have employment rates that 
are 4.2 percentage points below nonpregnant nonmothers191 and 
0.8 percentage points below nonpregnant mothers.192 Pregnant 
women who already have children, however, have employment 
rates that are 6.8 percentage points below nonpregnant 
 
 188. See infra note 324 and accompanying text (discussing prior studies that 
show positive effects of paid family leave on women’s post-childbirth employ-
ment). 
 189. Mothers are defined in the BRFSS as women who have one or more 
minor children living in their household. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, supra note 151, at 25. 
 190. See column two of Appendix Table 2. 
 191. See column two of Appendix Table 2. 
 192. See column one of Appendix Table 4 (limiting the regression sample to 
pregnant women and existing mothers). 
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nonmothers193 and 3.8 percentage points below nonpregnant 
mothers.194  
 
Figure 4. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of Women with-
out Children, Women with Children, and Pregnant Women, 
Ages 18–44, in the Labor Market 
 
Because motherhood is defined broadly in the BRFSS—as 
having a minor child under eighteen years old living in the 
household195—one potential pushback to drawing inferences re-
garding the motherhood penalty from Figure 4 relates to the age 
of children. To the extent that the motherhood penalty is driven 
by increased caretaking responsibilities, these caretaking re-
sponsibilities are typically highest (or at least, perceived to be 
highest) when a child is young.196 Along these lines, since a preg-
 
 193. See column two of Appendix Table 2. 
 194. See column one of Appendix Table 4. 
 195. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 151, at 25. 
 196. The EEOC recognizes the common perception that mothers of young 
children have more extensive caretaking responsibilities than do mothers of 
older children in its guidance on caretaker status. See Employer Best Practices 
for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html 
(last updated Jan. 19, 2011) (“Ensure that job openings, acting positions, and 
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nant woman is about to have a young child, comparing the em-
ployment rates of pregnant women and of mothers with young 
children offers a potentially better comparison of the pregnancy 
penalty and the motherhood penalty. Figure 5 makes precisely 
this comparison. The BRFSS does not contain information on age 
of a respondent’s children in every available year, just the years 
1994–2000 (inclusive). For these years, the BRFSS asks respond-
ents whether they have children ages zero to four. Using this 
additional data, Figure 5 graphs the employment rates of all 
mothers (circle line), mothers of children ages zero to four (plus 
line), and pregnant women (triangle line). Although the employ-
ment rate of mothers of young children falls below the employ-
ment rate of mothers generally, it remains consistently higher 
than the employment rate of pregnant women. This visual ob-
servation from Figure 5 holds in the raw and adjusted employ-
ment gap estimates. Between 1994 and 2000, the raw estimated 
gap in employment rates between pregnant women and mothers 
of young children is 4.3 percentage points;197 the regression-ad-
justed gap is 0.6 percentage points.198  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
promotions are communicated to all eligible employees regardless of caregiving 
responsibilities. Do not assume that certain employees (for example, mothers of 
young children or single parents) will not be interested in positions that require 
significant travel or working long or unusual hours.”). 
 197. See Figure 5. 
 198. See column two of Appendix Table 4 (limiting the regression sample to 
pregnant women and existing mothers of young children). 
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Figure 5. 1994–2000 BRFSS Employment Rates of Women with 
Children, Women with Children Ages 0–4, and Pregnant 
Women, Ages 18–44, in the Labor Market 
 
In sum, Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that the pregnancy 
penalty is more severe than the motherhood penalty. Although 
the pregnancy penalty may be partially explained by the well-
known penalty experienced by all mothers in the workplace, it 
cannot be fully explained by the anticipated long-term effects of 
becoming a mother. Thus, the next two Sections consider 
whether the pregnancy penalty can be further explained by the 
short-term appearance changes and activity limitations that of-
ten accompany the condition. 
2. Pregnancy and Appearance 
As discussed in Part I.A, pregnancy can transform a 
woman’s appearance in many respects. Although some of these 
changes may be considered appearance-improving, such as the 
famed “pregnancy glow,”199 other changes may not be as favora-
bly viewed by employers. The most obvious—and from an em-
ployment-outcomes perspective, most concerning—aspect of the 
 
 199. Yvonne Butler Tobah, Is Pregnancy Glow Real? MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 15, 
2018), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/pregnancy-week-by-week/ 
expert-answers/pregnancy-glow/faq-20115104. 
  
2018] THE PREGNANCY PENALTY 799 
 
appearance transformation that accompanies pregnancy is 
weight gain. In light of the prior research documenting a weight 
penalty for nonpregnant women in the labor market, the ques-
tion arises whether the weight penalty forms a component of the 
pregnancy penalty.200  
Figure 6 explores the relationship between pregnancy and 
weight, graphing, for comparison, the employment rates of the 
following groups: nonpregnant, normal-weight women (circle 
line); pregnant, normal-weight women (triangle line); nonpreg-
nant obese and morbidly obese women (plus line); and pregnant 
obese and morbidly obese women (diamond line). This graph sug-
gests that heavier women, regardless of pregnancy status, have 
lower employment rates than thinner women. The regression-
adjusted gaps in employment are particularly informative here. 
They suggest that a woman is penalized for gaining weight, even 
if she has a good reason, like pregnancy, for doing so. Compared 
to a nonpregnant, normal-weight woman, a nonpregnant, obese 
woman is 1.2 percentage points less likely to be employed; a 
pregnant, obese woman is 8.3 percentage points less likely to be 
employed.201 In other words, even if a woman has a very good 
reason to have a higher BMI, and even if the higher BMI is non-
permanent—as in the case of pregnancy—the weight penalty ap-
pears to hold for women’s employment outcomes. 
 
 
 200. Alternatively, weight might be treated differently (or more sympathet-
ically) in pregnant women than in nonpregnant women. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 201. See column 2 of Appendix Table 2. 
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Figure 6. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of Normal-
Weight Women (by Pregnancy Status) and Obese/Morbidly 
Obese Women (by Pregnancy Status), Ages 18–44, in the Labor 
Market 
 
This finding may be surprising, given that pregnant women 
are encouraged to gain weight (and are certainly difficult to 
blame for doing so).202 Nonetheless, two possible reasons may ex-
plain why weight is just as injurious to employment outcomes 
for pregnant women as for nonpregnant women. The 1993–2016 
BRFSS data do not contain information on a woman’s due 
date.203 As such, a pregnant woman with a higher BMI classifi-
cation may be closer to giving birth than a pregnant woman with 
a lower BMI classification. A sooner due date potentially may 
 
 202. This idea of individual blame has been particularly prevalent through-
out the legal literature on obesity. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the 
Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 142 (2013) (“As a 
legal and public policy issue, obesity has now been almost completely co-opted 
by public health. It is increasingly viewed as a behavior or ‘lifestyle’ choice that 
is dangerous for the individual’s health and costly for society, akin to smoking, 
illicit drug use, or risky sexual behavior.”). 
 203. See generally BRFSS Annual Survey Data, supra note 11 (asking ques-
tions about children in the home, income, number of dependents, and health, 
but not due dates). 
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signal a rapidly approaching leave of absence from work, espe-
cially for women whose jobs allow access to such leaves.204 If em-
ployers are more likely to terminate, or less likely to hire, preg-
nant women who are close to going out on maternity leave—even 
though such an adverse employment action may violate 
FMLA205—it could explain the lower employment rates of heav-
ier, pregnant women. 
Yet perhaps the more compelling explanation for the lower 
employment rates of heavier pregnant women derives from the 
already existing theories behind weight and appearance discrim-
ination, formed outside the context of pregnancy. As legal 
scholar Deborah Rhode has noted in her work on appearance dis-
crimination:  
For some goods and services, . . . employees’ attractiveness can be an 
effective selling point, and part of a strategy to “brand” the seller 
through a certain look. According to a spokesperson for the Borgata 
Hotel Casino and Spa, its weight limits and periodic “weigh-in” require-
ments for “Borgata Babes” cocktail waitresses responded to market de-
mands: “Our customers like being served by an attractive cocktail 
server.” Analogous assumptions evidently underpinned the order by a 
L’Oreal cosmetic store manager to “[g]et me somebody hot” for a sales 
position; Abercrombie and Fitch’s notorious policy of hiring sexually 
attractive, “classic American,” white salespersons; and the preference 
by certain bars and restaurants for staff that are “young” and “trendy” 
or not “too ethnic.” . . . “So You Want to Hire the Beautiful,” ran the 
title of a Business Week column. “Well, Why Not?”206 
In other words, the weight/appearance penalty against women 
is driven by employers’ desire to sell sex, based on a perception 
that their customers will be more responsive to a woman whom 
they find sexually appealing. This idea that appearance discrim-
ination in the workplace is driven by employers’ desire to sell sex 
is supported by empirical evidence: A 2016 study found the 
weight penalty for women was most severe in customer-facing 
jobs.207 To the extent that the weight penalty in the workplace is 
 
 204. Pregnant working women in the United States do not automatically 
have access to maternity leave, either paid or unpaid. Currently, the only fed-
eral protection available to working women who give birth is FMLA, which pro-
vides twelve weeks of unpaid leave to women who work full time for large em-
ployers (defined statutorily as fifty or more employees) and have done so for at 
least the past twelve months. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 205. Id. § 2601. 
 206. DEBORAH RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE 
IN LIFE AND LAW 106 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 207. See Shinall, supra note 36, at 132 (“[O]bese and morbidly obese women 
working in public-interaction jobs are paid less than normal-weight women 
working in precisely the same jobs.”). 
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derived from a reduced ability to sell sex, then weight gain be-
cause of pregnancy would arguably be just as injurious to a 
woman’s perceived sex appeal as would weight gain for any other 
reason.208 As such, part of the pregnancy penalty appears to de-
rive from an appearance-based component, but as seen in the 
next Section, it is further exacerbated by an ability-based com-
ponent. 
3. Pregnancy and Disability  
As the prior two Sections have described, the pregnancy 
penalty appears to be derived only partially from the mother-
hood penalty and exacerbated by the weight gain that generally 
accompanies the condition. This Section examines another po-
tential driver of the pregnancy penalty: pregnancy’s ability to 
limit a woman’s activities. As discussed in Part I.A, developing 
an activity limitation during pregnancy is common; the plaintiff 
in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. was herself a woman 
whose activities were reduced by pregnancy.209 Well-docu-
mented is the fact that developing such a limitation outside of 
pregnancy is harmful to wage and employment outcomes, which 
is known as the disability penalty. Still unknown is how the dis-
ability penalty interacts with the pregnancy penalty. 
To shed light on this issue, the BRFSS identifies women who 
are pregnant and either “limited in any way in any activities” or 
“require[] . . . use [of] special equipment.”210 Similar to weight, 
being disabled in the above manner seems to have an exacerbat-
ing effect on the pregnancy penalty. Disabled, pregnant women 
are 5.8 percentage points less likely to be employed than non-
disabled, pregnant women according to the raw estimate, and 
4.2 percentage points less likely to be employed according to the 
 
 208. Cf. RHODE, supra note 206, at 13, 91–116 (discussing employers’ argu-
ments in favor of selling sex appeal as a job requirement based on customer 
preferences). 
 209. Peggy Young was the plaintiff in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). After becoming pregnant, Young’s doctor told her “that 
she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her preg-
nancy or more than 10 pounds thereafter.” Id. at 1344. 
 210. The full BRFSS questions ask if respondents are “limited in any way in 
any activities because of physical, mental, or emotional problems” or have “any 
health problem that requires you to use special equipment, such as a cane, a 
wheelchair, a special bed, or a special telephone,” even if that use is only “occa-
sional” or “in certain circumstances.” Individuals who responded ‘yes’ to one or 
more of these questions are classified as disabled for the purposes of this Article. 
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 151, at 28. 
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regression-adjusted estimate.211 More concerningly, comparing 
these disabled, pregnant women to nondisabled, nonpregnant 
women reveals a tremendous gap in employment rates: a raw 
gap of 11.0 percentage points and an adjusted gap of 8.4 percent-
age points.212 The result is that women who are both disabled 
and pregnant endure shockingly high rates of unemployment. 
Considered together with the other findings from the BRFSS, 
pregnant, disabled women appear to be a subgroup particularly 
in need of increased legal protection. The next Part considers 
how best to increase such protection. 
V.  REMEDYING THE PREGNANCY PENALTY   
The prior Part utilized data from the only available large 
sample of pregnant women to quantify the pregnancy penalty, at 
least in terms of employment outcomes. This Part builds on that 
work and considers what policymakers can learn from that exer-
cise. I begin in Part V.A by considering the legislation favored by 
most pregnancy scholars and advocates, the PWFA,213 and 
demonstrate why evidence from the BRFSS casts doubt on the 
Act’s projected efficacy. In place of the PWFA, I advocate in Part 
V.B for the passage of federal paid family leave legislation that 
covers pregnant mothers prior to birth and both parents after 
birth. Because similar legislation has already passed in a hand-
ful of states, Part V.B uses the BRFSS data from these states to 
discern the critical features of family leave legislation. Part V.B 
additionally documents the efficacy of well-designed family leave 
legislation in remedying the pregnancy penalty. 
A. THE PROBLEMATIC PWFA 
As discussed in Part II.C, both legal scholars and advocates 
have broadly supported the proposed PWFA legislation as a 
needed and assured advancement for pregnant women in the 
workplace. Using data from the BRFSS, the empirical analysis 
presented in Part IV of this Article has bolstered prior argu-
ments that pregnant women need additional legislative support: 
As a group, pregnant women in the labor market have a great 
deal of catching up to do in terms of finding and maintaining 
employment. Yet at the same time, empirical analysis casts 
 
 211. See column two of Appendix Table 2. 
 212. See column two of Appendix Table 2. 
 213. Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2417, 115th Cong. (2017); Preg-
nant Workers Fairness Act, S. 1101, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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doubt on the PWFA’s ability to help these women catch up and 
to improve their employment rates.  
As drafted, the PWFA is based entirely upon the ADA 
model. The PWFA would provide “reasonable workplace accom-
modations for workers whose ability to perform the functions of 
a job are limited by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical 
condition”214—much in the same way that the ADA guarantees 
“reasonable accommodation”215 to individuals “substantially 
limit[ed in] one or more major life activities.”216 The only limita-
tion placed upon the guarantee of reasonable accommodation un-
der either the PWFA or the ADA is a showing that provision of 
such an accommodation would “impose an undue hardship” on 
the employer.217 
Although such protections sound good in theory, a great deal 
of empirical evidence exists to suggest that the ADA model does 
not work; it does not improve employment outcomes either spe-
cifically in terms of pregnancy or, more broadly, in terms of any 
covered health condition.218 To see the evidence specific to preg-
nancy, return to Figure 1, presented in Part IV.A.1. Recall that, 
in theory, the 2008 Amendments to the ADA expanded the Act’s 
coverage to include pregnant women whose condition substan-
tially limited them in a major life activity or caused them to be 
regarded as such.219 These Amendments went so far as to con-
vince the EEOC to reverse its ADA guidance on pregnancy—
from a pre-ADAAA position of no coverage unless pregnancy ex-
acerbated an underlying “physiological disorder”220 to a post-
ADAAA position that “likely . . . a number of pregnancy-related 
impairments that impose work-related restrictions will be sub-
stantially limiting, even though they are only temporary.”221 Yet 
in spite of this supposedly increased protection for pregnant 
women in the workplace, the visual evidence in Figure 1 indi-
cates that pregnant women have seen no improvement in em-
ployment rates in the post-ADAAA regime. Regression analyses 
confirm this visual evidence,222 demonstrating that employment 
 
 214. S. 1101. 
 215. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
 216. Id. § 12102(1)(A). 
 217. Id. § 12112(5)(A); S. 1101 § 2(1). 
 218. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 219. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 220. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1992).  
 221. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 67. 
 222. See column one of Appendix Table 5. 
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rates of pregnant women during the seven years following the 
2008 ADA Amendments were not statistically different from the 
employment rates of pregnant women during the seven years 
prior to the Amendments.223 Nor have pregnant women’s em-
ployment rates improved in a statistically meaningful way since 
the EEOC released its pregnancy guidance under the ADA in 
2015.224 
These findings with respect to pregnant women are not 
anomalous in terms of evaluating the ADA model’s performance. 
A vast economics literature already exists on the underperfor-
mance of the ADA225 and on other laws based upon the ADA.226 
 
 223. The regression methodology of comparing differences in an outcome of 
interest before and after a relevant event is known as difference-in-differences. 
More formally, I follow the difference-in-differences model below: 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛽 + 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛾1 + 𝑃𝑡𝛾2 + (𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑡)𝛾3 + 𝑆𝜎1 + 𝑇𝑡𝜎2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , 
where Y is the outcome variable of interest (employment), X is a vector of indi-
vidual characteristics (including age, age squared, race, ethnicity, highest level 
of education, marital status, and presence of a child), P is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the respondent is pregnant, L is an indicator variable equal to 
one for observations that postdate the relevant legal event outcomes (for the 
ADA, after the 2008 Amendments), P*Z is an interaction term (whose statistical 
significance will indicate whether the legislative event affected employment-
outcomes of pregnant women), S is state fixed effects, and T is year fixed effects. 
All regressions are estimated using a linear probability model since the outcome 
variable of interest is binary. The difference-in-differences model compares pre-
event outcomes with post-event outcomes, holding constant other relevant dif-
ferences in respondents. In Appendix Table 5, I present difference-in-differences 
regression results, comparing employment outcomes of pregnant women from 
2002 to 2008 to the outcomes from 2009 to 2015. Note that I do not include the 
2016 data in this analysis because of the potentially confounding effects of the 
Young decision. 
 224. A second differences-in-differences estimation, presented in Appendix 
Table 6, demonstrates that employment rates of pregnant women have not im-
proved in a statistically significant manner since 2015, in which both the EEOC 
issued its inclusive pregnancy guidance and the Supreme Court issued the 
Young decision. 
 225. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 61 (examining the ADA’s im-
pact on employment rates of disabled workers); John Bound & Timothy Waid-
mann, Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment Rates Among the Work-
ing-Aged Men and Women with Disabilities, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 231, 246–
48 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between disability insurance and employ-
ment rates for the disabled); DeLeire, supra note 61, at 708–11 (examining the 
impact of the ADA on employment and wages of disabled men); Julie L. Hotch-
kiss, A Closer Look at the Employment Impact of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 887, 907–09 (2004) (examining the effect of the ADA 
on the unconditional employment probability among the disabled); Douglas 
Kruse & Lisa Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 
42 INDUS. REL. 31, 60–62 (2003) (measuring the employment effects of the ADA 
with an alternative disability variable). 
 226. See, e.g., Beegle & Stock, supra note 62, at 856–57 (finding a decline in 
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These empirical evaluations of the ADA model consistently con-
clude that the ADA has failed to improve—and may have actu-
ally harmed—wage and employment outcomes of the disabled.227 
Although the majority of these evaluations have studied the pre-
Amendments version of the ADA, at least one empirical study 
has examined the post-Amendments version and found that em-
ployment outcomes of affected individuals still failed to im-
prove.228 
Although scholars both in law and in economics have previ-
ously issued valid critiques of the ADA model, their primary con-
cerns have diverged based on discipline. Economics scholars 
have been principally concerned with the ADA’s reasonable ac-
commodation model, which shifts both the determination of eli-
gibility and the costs of compliance entirely onto employers.229 
Unless an employee later sues, which remains a relatively rare 
occurrence,230 the employer serves, in the majority of cases, as 
the final decisionmaker on whether and what type of accommo-
dation is required by the ADA for a disabled worker.231 Moreo-
ver, given that the statutory guiding principles for employers are 
vague on their face—“reasonable” without imposing “undue 
hardship”232—the ambiguity inherent in the statute may enable 
 
labor market outcomes of the disabled after the passage of state disability laws 
based on the ADA model). 
 227. Compare Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 61, at 917, and DeLeire, su-
pra note 61, at 701 (finding a decline in labor market outcomes of the disabled 
after the passage of the ADA), with Bound & Waidmann, supra note 225, at 
245–46, Hotchkiss, supra note 225, at 907–09, and Kruse & Schur, supra note 
225, at 61 (finding no improvement in labor market outcomes of the disabled 
after the passage of the ADA). 
 228. See Shinall, supra note 103, at 11–20 (demonstrating that employment 
for at least one disabled group—the morbidly obese—has not improved since the 
passage of the 2008 ADA Amendments, which was intended to remedy the 
shortcomings of the original Act). 
 229. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 61, at 950 (blaming accommo-
dation costs (and costs arising from disputes over what constitutes a reasonable 
accommodation) for their finding that disabled men and women worked between 
one and four fewer weeks per year after passage of the 1990 version of the ADA); 
DeLeire, supra note 61, at 711 (concluding that the increased costs to firms aris-
ing from the ADA’s accommodation mandate was responsible for a 7.2 percent-
age point decline in employment of disabled men after 1990). 
 230. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 
433 (2004) (“[B]arely one in nine employment discrimination cases arise under 
the ADA or FMLA.”). 
 231. Id. at 440 (describing how most discrimination complaints do not pro-
ceed to some sort of adjudication). 
 232. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2012). 
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and embolden employers not to comply.233 According to economic 
theory, an employer will refuse to accommodate a disabled 
worker as long as the employer perceives that the cost associated 
with ADA compliance (i.e. the expected cost of accommodating a 
disabled worker) is greater than the cost associated with ADA 
noncompliance (i.e. the expected probability of being sued times 
the expected cost of a lawsuit).234 Some economists have blamed 
the underperformance of the ADA on compliance costs that are 
too high;235 others have blamed noncompliance costs that are too 
temptingly low.236 Nonetheless, virtually all economists agree 
that the relatively higher cost of compliance, when compared to 
the cost of noncompliance, that results from the reasonable ac-
commodation model is responsible for disabled workers’ lack of 
progress since the passage of the ADA.237 
In contrast, legal scholars have primarily criticized the ex-
pressive harms that inadvertently result from the ADA model. 
Vicki Schultz, for example, has argued that laws singling out 
certain individuals for additional protections in the workplace 
may “lead to increased stereotyping, discrimination, and resent-
ment against them. . . generally.”238 Unlike the Title VII model, 
the ADA model selects some individuals for protection, but not 
others, because it does not recognize reverse discrimination 
claims.239 Along these lines, Bradley Areheart has raised more 
 
 233. For a discussion of economists’ critiques of the reasonable accommoda-
tion model, see Shinall, supra note 103, at 4. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 61, at 950 (arguing that com-
pliance costs are too high since employers must bear the entirety of the accom-
modation costs, which may be uncertain in terms of both monetary and time 
cost); DeLeire, supra note 61, at 696 (same). 
 236. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 230, at 451–56 (illustrating 
the difficulty for employment discrimination plaintiffs of succeeding during lit-
igation); Shinall, supra note 103, at 4 (arguing that noncompliance costs are too 
low because employees are so unlikely to win employment discrimination law-
suits). 
 237. See DeLeire, supra note 61, at 694 (“[A]lthough the ADA may increase 
job accommodation for disabled workers, the costs of complying with the act may 
reduce the demand for their labor and undo its intended effects.”). 
 238. Schultz, supra note 134, at 1080. 
 239. Compare McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 
(1976) (recognizing reverse discrimination claims under Title VII), with Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 6(a), 
122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2012)) (“Nothing in [the ADA] 
shall provide the basis for a claim by an individual without a disability that the 
individual was subject to discrimination because of the individual’s lack of dis-
ability.”), and H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 17 (2008) (“The bill prohibits 
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extensive concerns with the ADA model for its unintended label-
ing effects. According to Areheart,  
the expressive impact that labeling . . . as a disability has on perceived 
work capability . . . expresses an inability to work. This signal is se-
lected in and further constructed by . . . the structure of public disabil-
ity benefits that define disability as an inability to work, and the very 
semantics of the word disability.240 
In other words, the stigma that results from singling certain in-
dividuals out as needing additional help to do their jobs may ul-
timately cause them more harm than good in the labor market. 
Both economists’ and legal scholars’ criticisms hold not just 
for the ADA, but for any law based on the ADA model, including 
the PWFA. Like the ADA, the PWFA would shift both the deter-
mination and the costs of reasonable accommodation compliance 
entirely onto employers. Furthermore, the PWFA would inflict 
precisely the same expressive harms as the ADA by singling out 
pregnant women for special treatment and arguably (albeit un-
intentionally) stigmatizing them as less able to work.241 These 
two issues, if left unaddressed, are likely to render any new preg-
nancy legislation ineffective, just as they have already rendered 
the ADA ineffective for disabled workers.242 One potential 
method of addressing these issues is to reform the ADA model 
entirely—as it affects pregnant women specifically and disabled 
workers more generally. In light of the ADA’s continual failure 
on the labor-market level, developing such a reform must become 
a priority for disability scholars243 and remains an issue I intend 
to confront in future work.  
 
reverse discrimination claims by disallowing claims based on the lack of disa-
bility . . . .”). 
 240. Areheart, supra note 64, at 1164; see also Michael Ashley Stein et al., 
Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 737 (2014) (arguing that 
workplace accommodations should be provided based on “effectiveness in ele-
vating functionality, instead of on recipients’ group-identity status”). 
 241. See Areheart, supra note 64, at 1164. 
 242. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 243. Several legal scholars have previously suggested reforming the ADA 
model by making accommodations more readily available to all. The idea behind 
such proposals is that the stigma of needing, asking for, and using an accommo-
dation in the workplace will diminish if everyone is entitled to one. Although 
these proposals would likely go far in reducing the expressive harms of the ADA 
model, they would do so at the expense of shifting additional and inherently 
uncertain costs onto employers, which make them unlikely to pass on the fed-
eral level in the near future. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 64, at 1169 (“Decou-
pling accommodations from protected classes would have little or no expressive 
harms for pregnant workers and would yield economic, hedonic, and structural 
benefits.”); Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) 
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In the meantime, however, a more straightforward solution 
than revolutionizing disability law exists to remedy the preg-
nancy penalty: paid family leave legislation. A well-designed 
family leave law can address much of the concern inherent in the 
ADA model. More crucially, empirical evidence suggests that a 
well-designed law can go far in remedying the pregnancy penalty 
in employment. The next Section explores this evidence in detail. 
B. PROMOTING PAID LEAVE LAWS 
Even though the PWFA, as currently designed, is unlikely 
to ameliorate the pregnancy penalty, an alternative solution can 
bring meaningful change to the employment outcomes of preg-
nant women. When implemented correctly, paid family leave 
laws can close the gap between pregnant and nonpregnant work-
ers. In this Section, I turn back to the BRFSS data to consider 
what lessons can be gleaned from the paid leave laws that al-
ready exist in a handful of states. 
1. Existing Paid Family Leave Laws 
Although the term paid family leave may be often tossed 
around by policymakers and the media, the term can encompass 
a variety of different concepts and, without further definitional 
precision, can be ambiguous in meaning.244 For instance, paid 
family leave might signify compensated leave time for one par-
ent or for both parents.245 It may signify leave before childbirth, 
or it may begin at the birth of the child.246 It may provide a small 
percentage of a parent’s normal pay, or it may provide full pay 
during the leave period.247 It may be funded by the employer, by 
employees themselves, or the cost may be shared.248 
Currently, laws mandating paid family leave in the United 
States exist only at the state and local level, and they remain 
 
Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833 (2016) (arguing for “accommodations to individ-
uals with health conditions more generally, not just individuals with ‘disabili-
ties’”); see also Stein et al., supra note 240, at 737–44 (arguing that “reasonable 
accommodations should be liberally available to all workers who need them and 
without reference to one’s identity”). 
 244. See Rossin-Slater, supra note 143, at 5 (“[T]here is wide variation in 
four key policy levers: duration, rights to payment during leave, job protection 
entitlement, and the financing of benefits.”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
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rare.249 They are principally funded through governmental disa-
bility insurance programs,250 which compensate individuals un-
able to work due to a non-job-related injury.251 The family leave 
provisions of these disability insurance programs take one of two 
general forms. The first form, referred to here as pre-family 
leave, provides leave to pregnant women due to complications 
from pregnancy and childbirth. That is, to the extent that preg-
nancy disables a mother, whether before or after giving birth, 
laws in two states and one U.S. territory mandate that she re-
ceive some weekly compensation from the state disability insur-
ance program while unable to work, up to half a year.252  
Disabled expectant and new mothers in Hawaii receive fifty-
eight percent of their weekly earnings (capped at $594),253 while 
similarly situated mothers in New York receive fifty percent of 
their weekly earnings (capped at $653).254 Puerto Rico, the only 
territory to mandate paid family leave, may at first appear to 
have the most generous compensation policy, providing sixty-
five percent of weekly pay to disabled new and expectant moth-
ers.255 Puerto Rico imposes such low caps ($55 for agricultural 
workers, $113 for nonagricultural workers), however, that the 
program is actually the least generous of the three.256 Even 
though paid leave of any kind may seem a modern concept, these 
 
 249. See State Family and Medical Leave Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (July 19, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/ 
state-family-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx (noting that only a few states offer 
paid family and medical leave). 
 250. Id. (noting that existing state programs “are funded through employee-
paid payroll taxes and administered through their respective disability pro-
grams”). 
 251. Compensation to individuals unable to work due to a job-related injury, 
in contrast, is provided through state workers’ compensation programs. See 
Widiss, supra note 23, at 984. 
 252. State Paid Family and Medical Leave Insurance Laws, NAT’L PARTNER-
SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES 1–2 (July 2018), http://www.nationalpartnership 
.org/research-library/work-family/paid-leave/state-paid-family-leave-laws.pdf. 
 253. HAW. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS. RELATIONS, HAWAII FAMILY LEAVE 
LAW (HFLL) AND THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) COMPARISON 
CHART (2013), http://labor.hawaii.gov/wsd/files/2013/10/Family-Leave 
-Comparison-Chart-rev-10-29-2013.pdf. 
 254. Paid Family Leave: Information for Employees, N.Y. ST., https:// 
paidfamilyleave.ny.gov/paid-family-leave-information-employees (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2018). 
 255. DI 52135.215 Puerto Rico Public Disability Benefits (PDB), U.S. SOC. 
SECURITY ADMIN. (Sept. 25, 2008), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/ 
0452135215. 
 256. Id. (citing the Puerto Rico benefits law). 
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three laws, which provide benefits to disabled mothers and dis-
abled workers more generally within the covered jurisdiction, 
have all been in place for half a century.257  
The second form, referred to here as full-family leave, pro-
vides the complete benefits of disability-related pre-family leave 
for the pregnant parent as well as caretaking-related leave for 
both parents after the birth of the child. Although more exten-
sive than pre-family leave programs, full-family leave programs 
are also exclusively funded through state disability insurance 
programs in the three states where they currently exist.258 In 
2004, California became the first state to mandate full-family 
leave, providing fifty-five percent of weekly pay (capped at 
$1173) for up to six weeks of caretaking leave for both parents 
and compensating birth mothers disabled by pregnancy at the 
same rate for up to one year.259 Note that the generosity of the 
California law ratcheted up on January 1, 2018 to seventy per-
cent of weekly pay for low-wage workers.260 
New Jersey followed suit in 2009, providing two-thirds of 
weekly compensation (capped at $633) to both parents for six 
weeks of caretaking leave, and the same rate of compensation to 
the birth mother for up to half a year of disability leave.261 Rhode 
Island, the most recently enacted law, passed in 2014, provides 
sixty percent of weekly pay (capped at $1173) to both parents for 
up to four weeks of caretaking leave and to the birth mother for 
up to thirty weeks of disability leave.262 Note, however, that the 
scope of full-family leave laws is rapidly expanding; in addition 
to the increased generosity of the California law beginning in 
2018, similar, new laws will go into effect in New York, the state 
 
 257. The New York law passed in 1949; the Puerto Rico law passed in 1968; 
and the Hawaii law passed in 1969. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392-1; N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 356.3; 11 L.P.R.A. § 203. 
 258. State Family and Medical Leave Laws, supra note 249 (noting that Cal-
ifornia, New Jersey, and Rhode Island’s leave programs are funded through 
state disability programs and employee payroll taxes). 
 259. CAL. EMP’T DEV. DEP’T, PAID FAMILY LEAVE MARKET RESEARCH 14 
(2015), http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/pdf/Paid_Family_Leave_Market_ 
Research_Report_2015.pdf. 
 260. See Major Paid Family Leave Expansion Signed by Governor, CAL. ST. 
ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS (Apr. 11, 2016), http://caucus.asmdc.org/press 
-release/major-paid-family-leave-expansion-signed-governor (discussing Cali-
fornia Assembly Bill 908). 
 261. Family Leave Insurance, N.J. DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., https:// 
www.nj.gov/labor/fli/fliindex.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
 262. Temporary Disability Insurance/Temporary Caregiver Insurance, R.I. 
DEP’T LAB. & TRAINING, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/tdi (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
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of Washington, and Washington D.C. within the next three 
years.263  
Because these laws—regardless of whether they provide 
pre-family or full-family leave—are funded through governmen-
tal disability insurance programs, the programs need not be 
funded solely by employer contributions. In fact, the existing pro-
grams in California and Rhode Island are entirely funded by em-
ployee payroll tax contributions; the programs in the remaining 
states are jointly funded by employers and employees.264 Moreo-
ver, the programs in all three states contain explicit weekly 
caps.265 As such, even though high-income workers may receive 
an absolutely greater amount during leave than low-income 
workers, high-income workers receive a relatively lower percent-
age of their average weekly income than do low-income workers.  
The fact that all states consistently tier leave compensation 
by average weekly income—but other aspects of the state laws, 
including wage replacement rate and cap amount, vary widely—
raises questions regarding family leave program design. Have 
any of these family leave programs successfully ameliorated the 
pregnancy penalty within the jurisdiction? If so, what design el-
ements of a family leave law are critical to its success? Yet before 
tackling these questions, the next Section steps back to assess 
whether family leave laws should target all pregnant women 
equally or, instead, specifically target certain subgroups of preg-
nant women.  
2. Determining the Target Population of Paid Leave Laws 
Thus far, this Article has considered pregnant women as a 
whole, demonstrating that the employment penalty encountered 
by pregnant women generally is both considerable and difficult 
to overcome. This Section, on the other hand, asks whether preg-
nancy has heterogeneous effects on distinct subpopulations of 
pregnant women. Asking such a question is critical to designing 
any legislative solution. If certain populations of pregnant 
women need more labor market support than others, then an 
ideal family paid leave law should specifically target these 
women. 
 
 263 State Paid Family and Medical Leave Insurance Laws, supra note 252, 
at 1, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/paid 
-leave/state-paid-family-leave-laws.pdf. 
 264. Id. at 5. 
 265. Id. at 7–9. 
  
2018] THE PREGNANCY PENALTY 813 
 
One subpopulation that immediately comes to mind are 
pregnant women of lower socioeconomic status. Some prior re-
search has suggested that pregnant women with lower education 
and lower incomes encounter the greatest roadblocks when try-
ing to take family leave from their jobs. A 2014 report by the 
Department of Labor, for example, concluded that low-income 
individuals were least likely to have access to any kind of family 
leave, let alone paid family leave.266 Similarly, a 2017 report by 
the AEI-Brookings Working Group suggested that paid family 
leave voluntarily offered by employers was a fringe benefit dis-
proportionately enjoyed by higher-level employees.267  
The existing research on availability of family leave has 
solely focused on the effects of family leave policies on post-child-
birth employment.268 Yet leave policies may also have significant 
effects on pre-childbirth employment. Pregnant women with ac-
cess to paid family leave or temporary disability leave prior to 
childbirth are protected in the event that they develop activity 
limitations. Without access to paid leave, a pregnant woman 
with an activity limitation faces the difficult choice of either 
ceasing to work269 (and facing potentially dire economic conse-
quences) or attempting to continue work in order to obtain a 
paycheck, even though continuing work might subject her to dis-
cipline for diminished job performance, termination,270 or worse, 
endanger her health or her baby’s health. Such difficult decisions 
are rendered even more difficult when a pregnant woman resides 
in an economically insecure household. Losing a paycheck or a 
job may devastate a household with few resources on which to 
fall back.271 
 
 266. JACOB ALEX KLERMAN ET AL., ABT ASSOCS., FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
LEAVE IN 2012: TECHNICAL REPORT 130 (2012), https://www.dol.gov/asp/ 
evaluation/fmla/FMLA-2012-Technical-Report.pdf (finding that low-income 
workers were least likely to have access to unpaid FMLA leave). 
 267. See AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAMILY LEAVE, PAID FAM-
ILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE: AN ISSUE WHOSE TIME HAS COME, at v (2017), http:// 
www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Paid-Family-and-Medical-Leave-An 
-Issue-Whose-Time-Has-Come.pdf (“[E]mployer-provided paid leave is concen-
trated among high-income workers; a majority of those below median income 
received no pay while on leave.”). 
 268. See infra note 324 and accompanying text. 
 269. Indeed, this is the story of Peggy Young in Young v. United Parcel Ser-
vice, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 270. If a pregnant woman was severely activity limited, discipline or termi-
nation might be legal under the PDA if the employer treated other non-preg-
nant, similarly limited employees in the same manner. See supra note 134 and 
accompanying text. 
 271. See J. Michael Collins & Leah Gjertson, Emergency Savings for Low-
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With these issues in mind, Figures 7 through 9 question 
whether employment outcomes of pregnant women differ by so-
cioeconomic status. Initially, Figures 7 and 8 examine the preg-
nancy penalty for low-education workers, defined as having a 
high-school education or less, as compared to the penalty for 
high-education workers, defined as having at least some college 
education. In both figures, the vertical distance between the cir-
cle (nonpregnant) and triangle (pregnant) lines represents the 
raw employment gap between these workers. 
 
Figure 7. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of Women with 
a High School Diploma or Less (by Pregnancy Status), Ages 18–
44, in the Labor Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income Consumers, 30 FOCUS 12, 15 (2013), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/ 
publications/focus/pdfs/foc301c.pdf (“Saving can be exceptionally difficult for the 
low-income population, because basic living expenses use a large proportion of 
available resources, leaving little or nothing left over to save.”). 
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Figure 8. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of Women with 
at Least Some College (by Pregnancy Status), Ages 18–44, in the 
Labor Market 
 
 
Together, Figures 7 and 8 indicate that the pregnancy pen-
alty falls disproportionately on women of lower educational lev-
els. Indeed, the average raw gap between the employment rates 
of pregnant and nonpregnant high-education women over the 
1993 to 2016 period is only 1.3 percentage points.272 Over the 
same period, the average raw gap between the employment rates 
of pregnant and nonpregnant low-education women is 12.7 per-
centage points—nearly tenfold the rate gap for high-education 
women.273 
Besides allowing for comparison of the pregnancy penalty 
along educational lines, the BRFSS also allows for comparison of 
the penalty across household income lines. BRFSS respondents 
report their household income in ranges.274 Using this infor-
mation, Figure 9 compares employment rates of pregnant and 
 
 272. The regression-adjusted employment gap over this period is 1.5 per-
centage points. 
 273. The regression-adjusted employment gap over this period is 8.8 per-
centage points. 
 274. The BRFSS ranges are less than $10,000, $10,000 to $14,999, $15,0000 
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nonpregnant women in the labor market, based on income 
level.275 The low-income range (less than $20,000) reflects 
women whose households live close to the federal poverty line.276 
The high-income range ($75,000 or more) reflects women who 
selected the highest household income range available in the 
BRFSS. 
 
Figure 9. 1993–2016 BRFSS Employment Rates of Women in the 
Labor Market, Ages 18–44, by Household Income Level 
 
As visible in Figure 9, over the 1993 to 2016 period, the raw 
employment gaps faced by pregnant women in the labor market 
living in middle- and high-income households are similar and 
relatively small: 4.0 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively.277 
 
to $19,999, $20,000 to $24,999, $25,000 to $34,999, $35,000 to $49,999, $50,000 
to $74,999, and $75,000 or more. Note that the top category was $50,000 or more 
in 1993. 
 275. Note that the top earners in 1993 ($50,000 or more) are included in the 
top income category in Figure 9. 
 276. During the 1993 to 2016 period, the federal poverty line for a household 
of four ranged from $14,350 to $24,300. See ASPE, Prior HHS Poverty Guide-
lines and Federal Register References, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/prior-hhs-poverty-guidelines-and-federal-register 
-references (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
 277. The regression-adjusted employment gaps over this period are 2.9 and 
2.8 percentage points, respectively. 
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For pregnant women living in low-income households, however, 
the raw employment gap is substantially greater: 11.1 percent-
age points.278 
Together, Figures 7 through 9 make clear that the preg-
nancy penalty disproportionately falls on women whose socioec-
onomic status is already disadvantaged. Regardless of how dis-
advantaged status is defined—through educational level or 
household income level—pregnant women in the labor market 
who fall on the low end of the distribution face employment gaps 
that are many times higher than pregnant women with advan-
taged socioeconomic status.  
Moreover, the relatively higher employment penalty experi-
enced by socioeconomically disadvantaged pregnant women 
compounds with the already lower rates of employment faced by 
all socioeconomically disadvantaged women, regardless of preg-
nancy status. Notice in Figures 7 through 9 that the baseline 
employment rates for nonpregnant women who are socioeconom-
ically disadvantaged are much lower than the rates for advan-
taged nonpregnant women. The combined result is employment 
rates that are startlingly low for socioeconomically disadvan-
taged pregnant women. The raw employment rates of low-edu-
cation pregnant women in the labor market are 22.5 percentage 
points lower than those of high-education nonpregnant women 
in the labor market, and 21.3 percentage points lower than those 
of high-education pregnant women. Similarly, the raw employ-
ment rates of low-income pregnant women in the labor market 
are 25.9 percentage points lower than those of high-income non-
pregnant women in the labor market, and 22.8 percentage points 
lower than those of high-income pregnant women.  
Given the employment gaps faced by all pregnant women in 
the labor market—gaps that are particularly immense for socio-
economically disadvantaged pregnant women in the labor mar-
ket—the question arises whether family leave laws can amelio-
rate any of the pregnancy penalty. The next Section turns to this 
question, examining how existing state family leave laws have 
affected the employment rates of pregnant women, paying par-
ticular attention to the employment rates of disadvantaged preg-
nant women. 
 
 278. The regression-adjusted employment gap over this period is 10.3 per-
centage points. 
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3. Determining the Efficacy of Paid Leave Laws 
In the prior Parts, this Article has made the case that the 
pregnancy penalty is a serious problem for women in the labor 
market, and particularly women in the labor market with low 
levels of education and household income. Yet still uncertain is 
whether family leave laws offer the appropriate solution. Fortu-
nately, since leave laws of various forms already exist in several 
states (as discussed in Part IV.B.1), their performance can pro-
vide insight regarding both their efficacy in reducing the preg-
nancy penalty and the critical components of a leave law.279 Fig-
ure 10 begins to examine these laws’ performance more 
critically, graphing the raw employment rates of women in the 
labor market by pregnancy status in states with family leave 
laws. Note that women who were taking paid family leave from 
their job at the time of responding to the BRFSS would still show 
up in the data as employed.280 For comparison, the final column 
in Figure 10 graphs average employment rates by pregnancy sta-
tus in the remaining states without family leave laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 279. Family leave laws might plausibly have other employment effects than 
on pregnant women’s employment—for instance, mothers’ and fathers’ employ-
ment after childbirth. See Charles L. Baum & Christopher J. Ruhm, The Effects 
of Paid Family Leave in California on Labor Market Outcomes, 35 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 333, 352 (2016) (arguing that increased leave-taking leads 
to higher post-birth employment rates). 
 280. Recall from Part V.B.1 that state paid family leave laws allow a woman 
to remain employed even while she is taking a pregnancy-related leave of ab-
sence. 
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Figure 10. BRFSS Employment Rates of Women in the Labor 
Market, Ages 18–44, by Pregnancy Status and State of Resi-
dence 
 
Turning initially to the three states with pre-family leave 
laws—New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico (the first three col-
umns on the left in Figure 10)—the gap in employment rates by 
pregnancy status look similar to the gap for states without a 
leave law (the last column on the right). In raw numerical terms, 
pregnant women in states without a leave law are 4.7 percentage 
points less likely to be employed than nonpregnant women; the 
raw gaps in New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico are 5.1, 3.0, and 
3.4 percentage points, respectively. Even in Hawaii and Puerto 
Rico, the pre-family leave jurisdictions with smaller employment 
gaps, the gaps remain present and are not much smaller than 
the gaps in states without a law. These remaining gaps suggest 
that pre-family leave laws do little, if anything, to reduce the 
pregnancy penalty. 
In order to examine the raw gaps in states with full-family 
leave laws, Figure 10 breaks up the data by pre- and post-pas-
sage date.281 Note that California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island 
 
 281. Because the passage of the pre-family leave laws all predate the BRFSS 
data, I am not able to make the pre- and post-comparison for the pre-family 
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had notable employment gaps between pregnant and nonpreg-
nant women in the labor market prior to passing a leave law 
(equal to 7.4, 3.8, and 11.4 percentage points, respectively). In 
these three states, these gaps reduced after full-family leave law 
passage. Note that the gap declined only slightly in California to 
5.2 percentage points, which is still above the average gap in 
states without a law. In New Jersey and Rhode Island, however, 
the gap not only reduced, but flip-flopped after passage such that 
pregnant women in these states actually had slightly higher em-
ployment rates than did nonpregnant women.  
Indeed, regression analyses confirm that New Jersey partic-
ularly has seen a meaningful improvement in pregnant women’s 
employment rates in the labor market since the passage of its 
family leave law. In Appendix Table 7, I compare the before- and 
after-employment rates of pregnant women in California, New 
Jersey, and Rhode Island to the employment rates of nonpreg-
nant women in those states, as well as the employment rates of 
women in surrounding states.282 This type of regression analysis, 
known as difference-in-differences regression, takes into account 
other underlying trends in employment in order to identify the 
effect of a law of interest—here, passing a state family leave 
law.283  
According to the analysis in Appendix Table 7, New Jersey 
alone has seen a statistically significant 6.6 percentage point in-
crease in employment rates of pregnant women since the pas-
sage of its family leave law (see Column 2). California, on the 
other hand, has seen no improvement in employment rates of 
pregnant women since the passage of its law (see Column 1). The 
effects of the Rhode Island law in this analysis are still uncertain 
(see Column 3), as the coefficient on pregnancy is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. Because of the recency of the Rhode 
Island law and Rhode Island’s small population, it is difficult to 
discern whether this statistical insignificance is due to insuffi-
cient data or lack of effects. Still, the effects of the New Jersey 
law have been quite clearly positive for pregnant women. More-
over, a follow-up analysis in Appendix Table 8 demonstrates that 
the largest gains in New Jersey have been concentrated among 
 
leave laws. 
 282. I am able to compare pre- and post-outcomes for the three full-family 
leave laws because these laws are more recent and, as such, the BRFSS data 
contains observations both before and after these laws’ passage. 
 283. This type of regression was previously used to evaluate the effect of the 
ADAAA and Young. See supra note 223. 
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precisely the group most in need of legal protection—pregnant 
women living in low-income households.284 
In sum, more sophisticated regression analyses confirm the 
visual evidence in Figure 10, which indicates that family leave 
laws have reduced, if not fully eliminated, the pregnancy penalty 
in some jurisdictions, but not in others. This Figure both makes 
clear that family leave laws are not a guaranteed fix for the preg-
nancy penalty and suggests that legislative design matters a 
great deal. The next Section considers which of the elements spe-
cifically have made the law in New Jersey more successful than 
the others. 
4. Considering Family Leave Law Design 
The quantitative analysis presented in the prior Section is 
useful to distinguish effective laws from ineffective ones, but a 
more qualitative analysis is necessary to understand why cer-
tain laws are more effective. To begin, consider the most obvious 
distinction in current leave law design: pre-family leave versus 
full-family leave. Figure 10 suggests that pre-family leave laws 
have not closed the gap in pregnant women’s employment out-
comes. While pre-family leave laws may have other desirable ef-
fects, pre-family leave laws seem to have done little good in 
terms of remedying the pregnancy penalty.285 One plausible ex-
planation for the lack of effects might be that existing pre-family 
leave laws solely provide leave to women disabled by pregnancy 
and childbirth, rather than pregnant women more generally.286 
The analysis in the prior Section points towards full-family 
leave laws as a better solution to the pregnancy penalty. Yet less 
clear from the empirical analysis is why New Jersey’s law has 
been an obvious success, while California’s law has been an ob-
vious failure.287 Answering this question requires reconsidering 
the design of these laws. Recall that during leave—whether pre- 
or post-childbirth—parents in California are reimbursed at the 
 
 284. Appendix Table 8 employs difference-in-difference-in-difference regres-
sion to compare employment outcomes of low-education/low-income pregnant 
women in the state of interest to those of higher education/income pregnant 
women in the state, nonpregnant women in the state, and women of all preg-
nancy statuses in surrounding states. 
 285. See supra Figure 10 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 287. See supra Figure 10 and accompanying text. 
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lowest rate of all leave laws: fifty-five percent of weekly earn-
ings.288 Parents in New Jersey, on the other hand, are reim-
bursed at the highest rate: sixty-six percent of weekly earn-
ings.289 For comparison, in Rhode Island, where the results are 
less clear, parents are reimbursed at sixty percent of weekly 
earnings.290 This fundamental difference in structure between 
state laws, which otherwise seem quite similar, provides the first 
clue that generosity of paid leave may be responsible for differ-
ences in effectiveness. 
Another clue that generosity of pay may be the secret to clos-
ing the pregnancy employment gap comes from relevant legisla-
tive history in the state of California. As mentioned previously, 
California has passed new legislation that goes into effect in 
2018, raising the wage replacement rate from fifty-five percent 
to seventy percent of weekly earnings for workers who earn one-
third or less of the state’s average income.291 For everyone else, 
the rate will increase to sixty percent of weekly earnings.292 The 
reason for this significant increase in replacement rate, accord-
ing to the legislation’s author and sponsor in the California As-
sembly, Jimmy Gomez, is due to the following: 
Paid Family Leave is a lifeline for countless families in our state. How-
ever, workers already living paycheck to paycheck on 100 percent of 
their salary simply could not afford to use a program for 6 weeks at 
nearly half of their wages. That’s why I authored [the legislation], to 
fix this inequity and ensure all who pay into this vital program can 
afford to use it, regardless of their income.293 
In other words, Gomez authored and sponsored the bill because 
he believed that paid leave was particularly critical for workers 
of lower socioeconomic status. This belief was bolstered not only 
by his own personal experience,294 but also by his knowledge 
that in the decade since passage, less than one-sixth of covered 
Californians had taken advantage of the state’s paid leave pro-
gram.295  
 
 288. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 292. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2655 (West 2016). 
 293. Major Paid Family Leave Expansion Signed by Governor, supra note 
260. 
 294. Patrick McGreevy, Brown Signs California Law Boosting Paid Family-
Leave Benefits, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la 
-pol-sac-paid-family-leave-california-20160411-story.html. 
 295. See id. (“EDD says that more than 2 million claims had been paid, alt-
hough about 13.1 million Californians were covered by the program.”). 
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Similarly, a 2011 Center for Economic and Policy Research 
survey found that “[n]early a third of respondents who were 
aware of [the California law] but did not apply for it when they 
needed a family leave . . . reported that they felt the level of wage 
replacement was too low.”296 Still another study by the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services found that less than 
ten percent of “lowest-income mothers” took advantage of paid 
leave in California.297 When conducting focus groups interviews 
to understand these numbers, the researchers repeatedly heard 
mothers who took advantage of the program complain that “they 
struggled to make ends meet” with such low wage replace-
ment.298 
In sum, wage replacement rate matters in paid family leave 
legislation. Without a sufficiently high rate of wage replacement, 
pregnant women are financially constrained in their ability to 
take advantage of paid leave. This constraint becomes particu-
larly binding for pregnant women living in low-income house-
holds, for whom the pregnancy penalty is already most acute,299 
and who are more likely to live from paycheck to paycheck with 
little emergency savings.300 As seen in California, the result of a 
low wage replacement rate is a low take-up rate of paid family 
leave. And if an insufficient number of people are taking ad-
vantage of family leave laws, it becomes difficult for such laws to 
 
 296. EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER 
AND WORKER EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2011), 
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf. 
 297. Lowest-income in this study was defined as a household income of 
$12,000 per year or less. PAMELA WINSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAID FAMILY LEAVE 
AND THE WELL-BEING OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA 4 
(2017), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/255486/PFL.pdf; see also RONA 
LEVINE SHERRIFF, CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, BALANCING WORK AND 
FAMILY (2007), http://sor.senate.ca.gov/sites/sor.senate.ca.gov/files/Balancing% 
20Work%20and%20Family%20Two-and-a-Half%20Years%20Ago%2C%20 
California%20Became%20the%20First%20State%20in%20the%20Nation.pdf 
(finding disproportionately low leave take-up rates for low-income workers). 
 298. WINSTON ET AL., supra note 297, at 16. 
 299. See supra Part V.B.2. 
 300. Although this problem is certainly most acute for low-income house-
holds, the financial constraints that impede pregnant women from taking leave 
may extend far beyond low-income households. A 2017 survey, for example, 
found that more than half of women were living paycheck to paycheck, and less 
than a third had enough savings to cover six months of living expenses. Sydney 
Champion, Survey Finds Great Recession Aftershocks Are Still Rattling Ameri-
cans, GOBANKINGRATES (June 26, 2017), https://www.gobankingrates.com/ 
making-money/survey-finds-great-recession-aftershocks-still-rattling 
-americans. 
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have any meaningful labor market effects, including effects on 
the pregnancy penalty. Given that these last two Sections have 
argued that the current model in New Jersey of paid family leave 
legislation is most successful, particularly because of its rela-
tively high wage replacement rate, the next Section considers 
additional improvements on the New Jersey model. 
5. Constructing the Ideal Paid Family Leave Model 
As discussed in Part V.B.3, pregnant women in New Jersey 
(and particularly low-income pregnant women in New Jersey) 
have seen a meaningful improvement in their employment for-
tunes since the passage of the state’s 2009 family leave law. The 
natural follow-up question then becomes whether the New Jer-
sey law should serve as the ideal model for future paid family 
leave legislation, or whether room still exists for improvement. 
One way to approach this question is to step back and consider 
the two principal criticisms levied at the PWFA—high employer 
costs and expressive harms—since family leave legislation may 
be susceptible to similar weaknesses. Assessing how current 
leave legislation performs in terms of these two potential pitfalls 
will not only highlight the advantages of full-family leave legis-
lation as compared to other alternatives, but also flag areas that 
need further improvement. 
Recall from Part V.A that economics scholars in particular 
have expressed concerns with the cost burden that the PWFA (or 
any law modeled after the ADA) may impose on employers since 
it shifts both the determination of eligibility and the costs of com-
pliance entirely onto employers. Full-family paid leave laws need 
not do either. Because all existing state laws are operated 
through the state disability insurance program, it is the state—
not the employer—who determines eligibility for paid leave. Ap-
plicants apply to the state,301 not to the employer, to take paid 
leave, which (1) diminishes the burden on employer human re-
sources staff to make leave coverage determinations, and (2) 
eliminates concerns about the employer having perverse incen-
tives to deny leave coverage, which is inherent to the PWFA and 
the ADA model.  
Moreover, once the state deems an applicant is eligible for 
paid leave, the wage replacement comes from the state fund, not 
 
 301. For an example of the New Jersey application process, see Family Leave 
Insurance, N.J. DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/ 
labor/fli/fliindex.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
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the employer.302 In states like California and Rhode Island (alt-
hough not New Jersey),303 this state fund is entirely financed by 
required employee payroll contributions, meaning that the em-
ployer bears no direct cost of paid family leave.304 Indeed, the 
only costs full-family leave laws impose on employers are indi-
rect ones, such as needing other employees to take on extra tasks 
and fill in while a worker is out on leave. Thus, current models 
of family paid leave laws—especially models financed entirely by 
employee contributions—already minimize concerns about 
overly burdening employers from a cost perspective.  
Even though employer costs are indirect and can be mini-
mized under paid full-family leave laws, recall that legal schol-
ars have raised a second concern with the PWFA (and the ADA 
model) that may be applicable to family leave: expressive harms. 
The concern is that any law singling out women for special treat-
ment because of pregnancy and childbirth risks labeling these 
women as less able, or unable, to be productive at work.305 To the 
extent that full-family leave laws potentially provide more leave 
to women than to men because of pregnancy-related disability 
provisions,306 some expressive harms may be unavoidable. It is 
unavoidable that women, but not men, experience the physical 
effects of pregnancy and consequently may require disability-re-
lated leave that men do not need. 
The key, then, must be to minimize the expressive harms of 
family leave laws on women. One significant advantage of full-
family leave laws over pre-family leave laws (besides their 
greater efficacy in reducing the pregnancy penalty, as docu-
mented in Figure 10) is that they provide leave to both men and 
women.307 Pre-family leave laws send the message that only 
women require leave surrounding the birth of a child; full-family 
 
 302. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 303. The New Jersey fund is financed jointly by employers and employees, 
which could be an area for reforming the New Jersey law, depending upon how 
onerous the cost burden of leave remains on employers. State Paid Family and 
Medical Leave Insurance Laws, supra note 252, at 5. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See supra Part V.A. 
 306. Since all full-family leave laws are operated through the state disability 
insurance program, a woman who has medical complications of pregnancy that 
prevent her from working will unavoidably be entitled to more leave than her 
nonpregnant spouse. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 307. See supra Part V.B.1. 
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leave laws send the message that all parents, regardless of gen-
der or pregnancy status, require leave. To that end, full-family 
leave laws are designed to inflict fewer expressive harms.308 
Still, expressive harms may result under full-family leave 
laws if, despite the entitlement to leave by parents of both gen-
ders, only women take advantage of the leave provided by law. 
Male parents may not take any family leave—or they may take 
less than their full entitlement—for financial reasons or for stig-
matization reasons.309 Anytime the wage replacement rate is 
less than one hundred percent, taking family leave may cause 
financial strain, especially since the family is, by definition, 
gaining a new (and costly) member. This strain may cause some 
families to decide that one parent will not take any leave, or at 
least take less leave than the other parent, surrounding the birth 
of a child. Because of the physical realities surrounding the birth 
of a child—pregnancy complications, childbirth recovery, and 
breastfeeding—families making this financially-motivated 
choice may favor a female parent taking more leave. This choice 
is further solidified by the fact that, on average, men earn more 
than women, and thus, losing the male’s full paycheck would of-
ten hurt the family more.310 Indeed, evidence exists to support 
the idea that families make precisely this choice to forego or limit 
male parental leave when facing financial constraints.311 
On the other hand, families may choose to have a female 
parent take more leave because of social, not financial, pres-
sures. Women continue to be the primary household caregivers 
in the United States, thus perpetuating the stereotype that 
women will take primary responsibility for raising a new child 
 
 308. Cf. APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra note 296, at 18 (finding “an increase 
in use of parental leave by fathers since the state program began” in California). 
 309. Evidence exists from California to suggest that male paid family leave 
take-up rates are half as large as female take-up rates. See id. (“Our survey 
found a gender gap[:] . . . 25 percent of male respondents, but 49 percent of fe-
males, had made use of the program.”); see also Dianna Douglas, How to Get 
Dads to Take Parental Leave? Seeing Other Dads Do It, NPR (Feb. 8, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/02/08/465726445/how-to-get-dads-to-take-parental 
-leave-seeing-other-dads-do-it (reporting that ninety-six percent of American 
men are back to work within two weeks after the birth of a child). 
 310. See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: 
POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 134 (2003) (“Be-
cause men tend to have higher wages than women, in the absence of full wage 
replacement it often makes economic sense for couples to decide that the mother 
should withdraw from the labor market.”). 
 311. See WINSTON ET AL., supra note 297, at 9 (“Some of the mothers in our 
focus groups said that the wage replacement rate was too low for the fathers 
also to take it—the hit to the family’s wages was too large.”). 
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and should take more childbirth-related leave than men.312 Be-
cause of the prevalence of this stereotype, many men feel stig-
matized against taking their full leave entitlement, believing 
that doing so might put their current job or future career in jeop-
ardy because their coworkers will view them as doing women’s 
work.313 Although some empirical evidence validates this cur-
rent perception of a workplace stigma against men taking too 
much family leave,314 empirical evidence also suggests that the 
best way to reduce the stigma is to make it more commonplace 
for men to take family leave. For example, one study from Nor-
way found that men who saw a male coworker take family leave 
were eleven percentage points more likely to take it them-
selves.315 
Consequently, the key to minimizing expressive harms in 
family leave laws is to incentivize a critical mass of men to over-
look any social or financial pressures and to take their entire 
leave entitlement. One way to nudge men into overlooking finan-
cial pressures may be to simply reduce such pressures altogether 
by offering high wage replacement rates during family leave.316 
Full-family leave laws with high wage replacement rates are al-
ready the most effective at reducing the pregnancy penalty, as 
 
 312. Only one in five fathers with preschool aged children assume primary 
caregiving responsibility. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, One-Third of Fa-
thers with Working Wives Regularly Care for Their Children, Census Bureau 
Reports (Dec. 5, 2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/ 
children/cb11-198.html. 
 313. See, e.g., Deloitte Survey: Less than Half of People Surveyed Feel Their 
Organization Helps Men Feel Comfortable Taking Parental Leave, PR NEWS-
WIRE (Jun 15, 2016), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/deloitte 
-survey-less-than-half-of-people-surveyed-feel-their-organization-helps 
-men-feel-comfortable-taking-parental-leave-300284822.html (reporting that 
“fewer than half of the respondents fe[lt] their company foster[ed] an environ-
ment in which men are comfortable taking parental leave”). 
 314. See, e.g., id. (“Not only do more than one-third of respondents feel that 
taking parental leave would jeopardize their position, but more than 
half . . . feel that it would be perceived as a lack of commitment to the job . . . .”); 
see also Claire Cain Miller, Paternity Leave: The Rewards and the Remaining 
Stigma, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/ 
upshot/paternity-leave-the-rewards-and-the-remaining-stigma.html (arguing 
that there is still some stigma associated with paternity leave). 
 315. Gordon B. Dahl et al., Peer Effects in Program Participation, 104 AM. 
ECON. REV. 2049, 2050 (2014). 
 316. See GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 310, at 134 (“Although none of the 
countries in our study have achieved gender equality, several are taking steps 
to increase fathers’ use of leave benefits. . . . High wage-replacement rates are 
the most straightforward instrument.”). 
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seen in the prior Section with New Jersey. If high wage replace-
ment rates successfully encourage more men to take advantage 
of their entire family leave entitlement by reducing financial 
burdens, in the long run, high rates of replacement can also ren-
der men’s leave-taking less disproportionate to women’s leave-
taking and, in turn, reduce expressive harms.317 
To the extent that financial incentives are not enough to 
overcome social pressures, other countries have introduced ad-
ditional provisions into their family leave legislation to nudge 
men into taking their entire family leave entitlement. One in-
centive that has been particularly successful is the use-it-or-lose-
it provision, which conditions the generosity of family leave time 
on both parents taking it.318 In its most draconian version, such 
a provision would require both parents to take equally long paid 
leave from work or risk forfeiting it entirely. In Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden, however, the use-it-or-lose-it provision is 
softer. These countries grant paid leave on a family basis, in-
stead of an individual one. If the father fails to take paid family 
leave, the family gets less total paid leave time.319 For example, 
if the mother alone takes family leave, the family might only get 
four weeks of paid leave, but that time would double if the father 
also takes leave. Predictably, men’s take-up of family leave has 
significantly increased in Scandinavia since these laws 
passed.320  
Presently, none of the state and local family leave laws 
within the United States have any kind of use-it-or-lose-it provi-
sion, despite these provisions’ effectiveness in other countries. 
Domestic laws could easily add such a provision without increas-
ing costs to the system by conditioning the length of one parent’s 
paid leave on the length of the other parent’s paid leave. For in-
stance, if the father only takes two weeks of post-childbirth paid 
leave, even though entitled to more, then the mother can only 
take two weeks of post-childbirth paid leave. Naturally, this 
model only works for households in which both parents are pre-
sent and both parents work. Nonetheless, these dual-parent, 
 
 317. Indeed, research from Scandinavian countries with full-family paid 
leave laws has found that high-wage replacement rates are critical for fathers 
to take advantage of leave. For a review of this literature, see id. at 133–38. 
 318. See POLITICISING PARENTHOOD IN SCANDINAVIA: GENDER RELATIONS 
IN WELFARE STATES 38–40 (Anne Lise Ellingsaeter & Arnlaug Leira eds., 2006). 
 319. For a chart comparing the family leave laws in several European coun-
tries, see id. at 19–23. 
 320. For a review of the Scandinavian family leave laws and analyses of their 
effects, see id. at 1–51, 265–77. 
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dual-earner households may be the most likely to have inequita-
ble leave take-up along gender lines.321 In sum, even the most 
successful current family leave laws, such as the one in New Jer-
sey, and future leave laws can benefit from a use-it-or-lose-it pro-
vision. Such a provision can advance the progress towards gen-
der equality in take-up of family leave and, in turn, reduce the 
expressive harms that continue to fall on women surrounding 
pregnancy- and childbirth-related leave. 
  CONCLUSION   
Despite the renaissance of pregnancy-related scholarship 
over the past decade,322 very little has been documented empiri-
cally regarding the status of pregnant women in the labor mar-
ket. As such, scholars and advocates have been constrained in 
their ability to assess both the adequacy of current legislation 
and the relative urgency for new legislation. Furthermore, in the 
absence of labor market data, they have been limited in their 
ability to propose reform measures that can target the pregnant 
women most in need of assistance. This Article has taken an in-
itial step towards filling these critical gaps in the literature, uti-
lizing a health behaviors dataset with a sufficiently large sample 
of pregnant women to examine their welfare, in terms of employ-
ment, over the past quarter-century. Using these data, this Ar-
ticle has argued that, in light of the stark employment gaps faced 
by pregnant women—gaps that widen tremendously for heavier 
women, disabled women, women with low educational attain-
ment, and women living in low-income households—improving 
legislative protections surrounding pregnancy should be a prior-
ity for civil rights’ advocates.  
This Article has also identified full-family paid leave legis-
lation as an important measure in closing the employment gap 
between pregnant women and nonpregnant women. This Article 
is hardly the first to advocate for paid family leave,323 yet most 
prior arguments for leave have examined its influence on post-
childbirth outcomes for women who work outside the home.324 
 
 321. See, e.g., Hersch, supra note 86 (finding that married women spend al-
most twice as much time on childcare as married men). 
 322. See supra Part II. 
 323. For a recent, bipartisan report that comprehensively reviews research 
on family leave, see AEI-BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON PAID FAMILY LEAVE, 
supra note 267.  
 324. See, e.g., Baum & Ruhm, supra note 279, at 334 (finding that mothers 
with paid leave were more likely to be employed nine to twelve months post-
birth); LINDA HOUSER & THOMAS P. VARTANIAN, RUTGERS CTR. FOR WOMEN 
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Using New Jersey as an example, this Article has demonstrated 
that a well-constructed family leave policy with high wage re-
placement can also improve pre-childbirth outcomes for women 
who work outside the home—and particularly women of lower 
socioeconomic status who work outside the home. Moreover, by 
financing paid family leave through employee payroll contribu-
tions, administering leave entitlement through the state, and in-
cluding provisions that sufficiently encourage men to take leave, 
full-family paid leave policies can ameliorate the pregnancy pen-
alty in a way that has few direct costs for employers and that 
minimizes expressive harms to women.  
Women are an integral part of the labor market, and preg-
nancy is an integral part of most women’s lives. Women comprise 
roughly forty-seven percent of the U.S. labor force,325 and more 
than eighty percent of women will likely be pregnant at least 
once in their lifetimes.326 The U.S. labor market cannot function 
even in the short-term without women, and it cannot survive in 
the long-term without pregnancy. In spite of the labor market’s 
dependency on them, pregnant women continue to face an em-
ployment penalty that rivals any penalty faced by other histori-
cally disadvantaged groups. A financially feasible legislative 
model already exists to remedy the pregnancy penalty. Broaden-
ing the reach of this paid full-family leave model beyond a hand-
ful of U.S. states remains in the hands of legislators. 
 
  
 
AND WORK, PAY MATTERS: THE POSITIVE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PAID FAMILY 
LEAVE FOR FAMILIES, BUSINESSES AND THE PUBLIC 2 (2012), http://www 
.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/work-family/other/pay-matters.pdf 
(finding that women with access to paid leave are much less likely to be on food 
stamps or other forms of public assistance in the year after childbirth); Rossin-
Slater, supra note 143, at 4 (finding that leaves of less than one year improve 
mothers’ employment outcomes several years after birth). 
 325. These statistics come from 2015. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 2 (2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/2016/home.htm. 
 326. Gretchen Livingston, Childlessness, PEW RES. CTR. (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/07/childlessness. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1. 
Summary Statistics for Women, Ages 18–44, 1993–2016 BRFSS, by 
Pregnancy Status 
 All Women Pregnant 
Women 
Nonpregnant 
Women 
In the Labor Market 0.72 0.66 0.72 
Employed 0.91 0.86 0.91 
Unemployed 0.09 0.14 0.09 
Demographics    
Age 31.61 27.98 31.78 
White 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Black 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Asian 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Other Race 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Hispanic 0.16 0.18 0.15 
Child Present 0.67 0.68 0.67 
Married 0.55 0.70 0.55 
Disabled 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Underweight/ 
Normal Weight 
0.57 0.50 0.58 
Overweight 0.24 0.29 0.24 
Obese 0.16 0.18 0.15 
Morbidly Obese 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Household Income $49,370.09 $49,103.72 $49,382.93 
Educational  
Attainment 
   
Less than High School 0.09 0.13 0.10 
High School  
Graduate 
0.28 0.27 0.28 
Some College 0.31 0.26 0.31 
College Graduate 0.32 0.34 0.31 
N 1,326,026 53,031 1,272,995 
Notes: Estimated means come from 1993–2016 BRFSS, using sample design 
weights. Household income is reported in 2017 U.S. dollars. 
 
  
  
832 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:749 
 
Appendix Table 2. 
The Relationship Between Pregnancy, Weight, and Disability and 
Employment for Women in the Labor Market, Ages 18–44, 1993–2016 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pregnant -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.155*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.018) 
Obese ——- -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Pregnant* 
Obese 
——- -0.029*** -0.020** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Morbidly 
Obese 
——- -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Pregnant* 
Morbidly 
Obese 
——- -0.010 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Disabled ——- -0.089*** -0.089*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Pregnant* 
Disabled 
——- 0.047** 
(0.018) 
0.045** 
(0.017) 
Black -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.044*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Asian -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Hispanic -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Child Pre-
sent 
-0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
High School 
Graduate 
0.096*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pregnant* 
High School 
Graduate 
——- ——- 0.073*** 
  (0.024) 
Some Col-
lege 
0.142*** 0.141*** 0.134*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pregnant* 
Some Col-
lege 
——- ——- 0.135*** 
  (0.018) 
College 
Graduate 
0.162*** 0.157*** 0.150*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Pregnant* 
College 
Graduate 
——- ——- 0.142*** 
  (0.018) 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from 1993–2016 BRFSS, using 
sample design weights, and contain 986,227 observations of women ages 18 
to 44. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, 
are in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent variable 
is an indicator equal to one if the respondent is employed for wages or self-
employed, and equal to zero if the respondent is out of work. All estimates 
include controls for age and age squared, other nonwhite race, state fixed 
effects, and year. Specifications (2) and (3) also include an indicator variable 
equal to one if the respondent is overweight and an interaction term between 
pregnancy and being overweight. 
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Appendix Table 3. 
The Relationship Between Pregnancy, Weight, and Disability and 
Participation in the Labor Market, Ages 18–44, 1993–2016 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pregnant -0.023*** -0.016* -0.016 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) 
Obese ——- 0.027*** 0.027*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Pregnant* Obese ——- -0.033*** -0.033*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Morbidly Obese ——- -0.007* -0.007* 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Pregnant* 
Morbidly Obese 
——- -0.053* -0.053* 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
Disabled ——- -0.160*** -0.160*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Pregnant* 
Disabled 
——- 0.102*** 
(0.014) 
0.102*** 
(0.014) 
Black 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Asian -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Hispanic -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Child Present -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.092*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.091*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
High School 
Graduate 
0.135*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pregnant* High 
School Graduate 
——- ——- -0.015 
  (0.011) 
Some College 0.118*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Pregnant* Some 
College 
——- ——- 0.016 
  (0.014) 
College Gradu-
ate 
0.191*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
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Pregnant* Col-
lege Graduate 
——- ——- 0.001 
  (0.018) 
R2 0.06 0.08 0.08 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from 1993–2016 BRFSS, using 
sample design weights, and contain 1,326,026 observations of women ages 
18 to 44. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state 
level, are in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to one if the respondent is employed for 
wages, self-employed, or out of work, and equal to zero if the respondent is 
a homemaker, student, retired, or unable to work. All estimates include 
controls for age and age squared, other nonwhite race, state fixed effects, 
and year. Specifications (2) and (3) also include an indicator variable equal 
to one if the respondent is overweight and an interaction term between 
pregnancy and being overweight. 
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Appendix Table 4. 
The Relationship Between Pregnancy, Weight, and Disability and 
Employment for Mothers in the Labor Market, Ages 18–44 
 Sample: Mothers and 
Pregnant Women, 
1993–2016 
Sample: Mothers of 
Children Ages 0–4 and 
Pregnant Women, 
1994–2000 
 (1) (2) 
Pregnant -0.038*** -0.070*** 
 (0.008) (0.024) 
Obese -0.013*** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
Pregnant* Obese -0.021* -0.039 
 (0.011) (0.033) 
Morbidly Obese -0.019*** -0.015 
 (0.005) (0.023) 
Pregnant* Morbidly 
Obese 
-0.015 -0.133 
(0.016) (0.082) 
Disabled -0.088*** -0.032 
 (0.005) (0.045) 
Pregnant* Disabled 0.042** 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.068) 
Black -0.044*** -0.023** 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
Asian -0.049*** -0.054** 
 (0.005) (0.027) 
Hispanic -0.011*** -0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
Child Present -0.030*** -0.064** 
 (0.010) (0.026) 
Married 0.041*** 0.054*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
High School  
Graduate 
0.087*** 0.097*** 
(0.009) (0.016) 
Some College 0.141*** 0.155*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) 
College Graduate 0.159*** 0.151*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) 
R2 0.08 0.08 
N 490,825 20,630 
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* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from BRFSS, using sample design 
weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state 
level, are in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to one if the respondent is employed for wages 
or self-employed, and equal to zero if the respondent is out of work. All esti-
mates include controls for age and age squared, other nonwhite race, an in-
dicator variable equal to one if the respondent is overweight, an interaction 
term between pregnancy and being overweight, state fixed effects, and year.  
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Appendix Table 5. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) on Employment of Pregnant Women 
 Double-Difference: The 
Effect of the ADAAA on 
Pregnant Women 
Triple Difference: The 
Effect of the ADAAA on 
Pregnant, Disabled 
Women 
 (1) (2) 
Pregnant -0.041*** -0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Post-2008 0.026 0.030* 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Disabled -0.093*** -0.086*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Pregnant* Disabled 0.044** 0.053** 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
Post-2008* Preg-
nant 
0.009 0.013** 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Post-2008* Disabled ——- -0.020*** 
  (0.006) 
Post-2008* 
Pregnant* Disabled 
——- -0.033 
 (0.036) 
R2 0.07 0.07 
N 718,799 718,799 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from 18- to 44-year-old female re-
spondents to the 2002–2016 BRFSS, using sample design weights. Het-
eroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in pa-
rentheses underneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if the respondent is employed for wages or self-em-
ployed, and equal to zero if the respondent is out of work. All estimates in-
clude controls for age and age squared; race and ethnicity; presence of a child; 
married; highest level of education; indicator variables equal to one if the 
respondent is overweight, obese, or morbidly obese; interaction terms be-
tween pregnancy and being overweight, obese, or morbidly obese; state fixed 
effects; and year.  
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Appendix Table 6. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of the March 2015 
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Decision on Employment of 
Pregnant Women 
 (1) 
Pregnant -0.044*** 
 (0.012) 
Post-March 2015 0.001 
 (0.004) 
Post-March 2015* Pregnant 0.012 
 (0.022) 
Disabled -0.108*** 
 (0.006) 
Pregnant* Disabled -0.098* 
 (0.052) 
R2 0.07 
N 127,657 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from 18- to 44-year-old female re-
spondents to the 2014–2016 BRFSS, using sample design weights. Het-
eroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in pa-
rentheses underneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if the respondent is employed for wages or self-em-
ployed, and equal to zero if the respondent is out of work. All estimates in-
clude controls for age and age squared; race and ethnicity; presence of a child; 
married; highest level of education; indicator variables equal to one if the 
respondent is overweight, obese, or morbidly obese; interaction terms be-
tween pregnancy and being overweight, obese, or morbidly obese; state fixed 
effects; and year.  
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Appendix Table 7. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of Full-Family 
Leave Laws on Employment of Pregnant Women 
 2004 California 
Law 
2009 New Jer-
sey Law 
2014 Rhode Is-
land Law 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pregnant -0.071*** -0.019 0.015 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) 
Post-Family 
Leave Law 
0.007 -0.006 0.006 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Pregnant* Post-
Family Leave 
Law 
0.002 0.066** 0.033 
(0.035) (0.030) (0.052) 
R2 0.051 0.068 0.082 
N 50,213 50,409 17,949 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from 18- to 44-year-old female re-
spondents to the BRFSS, using sample design weights. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses un-
derneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent variable is an indicator equal 
to one if the respondent is employed for wages or self-employed, and equal to 
zero if the respondent is out of work. All estimates include controls for age 
and age squared; race and ethnicity; presence of a child; married; highest 
level of education; indicator variables equal to one if the respondent is over-
weight, obese, or morbidly obese; interaction terms between pregnancy and 
being overweight, obese, or morbidly obese; and year. California sample in-
cludes 1993–2016 data from the states of California, Nevada, and Oregon; 
additional state fixed effects for Nevada and Oregon are included in the esti-
mation. New Jersey sample includes 2002–2016 data from the states of New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; additional state fixed effects for Penn-
sylvania and Delaware are included in the estimation. Rhode Island sample 
includes 2011–2016 data from the states of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts; additional state fixed effects for Connecticut and Massachu-
setts are included in the estimation. 
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Appendix Table 8. 
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of 
Full-Family Leave Laws on Employment of Low-Education and Low-
Household-Income Pregnant Women 
Low-Education Women 
 2004 Califor-
nia Law 
2009 New Jer-
sey Law 
2014 Rhode Is-
land Law 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Pregnant -0.046** 0.001 0.024 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) 
Post-Family Leave Law 0.011 0.003 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Pregnant* Post-Family 
Leave Law 
0.002 0.034 0.027 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.053) 
Pregnant* Low Educa-
tion 
-0.073* -0.080* -0.072 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.057) 
Pregnant* Post-Family 
Leave Law* Low Edu-
cation 
-0.007 0.107 0.034 
(0.084) (0.097) (0.160) 
R2 0.048 0.062 0.078 
N 50,213 50,409 17,949 
Low-Household-Income Women 
 2004 Califor-
nia Law 
2009 New  
Jersey Law 
2014 Rhode 
Island Law 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Pregnant -0.047** 0.007 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) 
Post-Family Leave Law 0.004 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Low Household Income -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.137*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Pregnant* Post-Family 
Leave Law 
-0.004 0.030 0.001 
(0.031) (0.028) (0.061) 
Pregnant* Low House-
hold Income 
-0.058 -0.207*** 0.011 
(0.054) (0.060) (0.056) 
Pregnant* Post-Family 
Leave Law* Low 
Household Income 
0.022 0.228** 0.136 
(0.095) (0.104) (0.121) 
R2 0.070 0.088 0.103 
N 50,213 50,409 17,949 
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* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: Linear probability estimates come from 18- to 44-year-old female re-
spondents to the BRFSS, using sample design weights. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses un-
derneath the estimated coefficient. Dependent variable is an indicator equal 
to one if the respondent is employed for wages or self-employed, and equal to 
zero if the respondent is out of work. All estimates include controls for age 
and age squared; race and ethnicity; presence of a child; married; highest 
level of education; indicator variables equal to one if the respondent is over-
weight, obese, or morbidly obese; interaction terms between pregnancy and 
being overweight, obese, or morbidly obese; and year. Low-income is defined 
as earning less than $20,000 per year; low-education is defined as having a 
high school degree or less. California sample includes 1993–2016 data from 
the states of California, Nevada, and Oregon; additional state fixed effects 
for Nevada and Oregon are included in the estimation. New Jersey sample 
includes 2002–2016 data from the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Delaware; additional state fixed effects for Pennsylvania and Delaware are 
included in the estimation. Rhode Island sample includes 2011–2016 data 
from the states of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts; additional 
state fixed effects for Connecticut and Massachusetts are included in the es-
timation. 
 
 
